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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

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THESIS

**TRANSFORMING ARMY GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
FOR SIMULTANEOUS DISSIMILAR OPERATIONS**

by

Sean M. Hevey

Timothy N. Bible

December 2008

Thesis Advisor:
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**TRANSFORMING ARMY GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES FOR
SIMULTANEOUS DISSIMILAR OPERATIONS**

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ABSTRACT

Preparedness for operations in both the Irregular Warfare (IW) and Major Combat Operations (MCO) environments is essential given a tumultuous and unpredictable Contemporary Operational Environment (COE). This thesis is an effort to provide a solution to the U.S. Army's emerging trend toward uni-focused operations fixated on IW. In this thesis, we propose recommendations for change to the current Army force structure centered on the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) and the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model through which these units are cycled for refit, training, and deployment. These recommended modifications are intended to optimize the Army for its role as a deterrent force, and to assist the Army in its ability to proficiently conduct operations in the IW and MCO environments either consecutively or simultaneously.

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I. BURNING THE WAGONS

On January 17, 1781, British commander of southern operations, Lord Charles Cornwallis, suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of American Brigadier General Daniel Morgan during the Battle of Cowpens in South Carolina. In order to increase the survivability of his numerically inferior force and to exploit British weaknesses, Morgan had, over time, tailored his units to execute a style of warfare asymmetric to the accepted practices of the day. At Cowpens, Morgan devised a plan to defeat Cornwallis through the utilization of tactics that capitalized on the British leader's disdain for the American militia. Morgan's intention was to lure the British troops into an engagement area by placing his militia out front where they would appear vulnerable. The American militiamen were instructed to fire multiple volleys until threatened by the advancing Brits, at which time they were to feint a retreat, hopefully drawing the British within range of Continental regulars that lay in wait out of sight. The plan worked as designed with British casualties surpassing one hundred killed and eight hundred captured, compared with the Continental Army's twelve killed and sixty wounded.¹ Desiring revenge for this defeat, Cornwallis readied his army to give chase to Morgan in what would become a sprint to the ford site on the Dan River bordering North Carolina and Virginia. Realizing his conventional forces required a large, slow-moving logistical tail in order to operate in a manner consistent with what they had become accustomed, Cornwallis chose to break with this *modus operandi*, and forced his units to adopt the bare-bones logistical support of Morgan's army. To achieve this, Cornwallis ordered the burning of "surplus wagons, baggage, supplies and equipment so that he could move faster."² This, however, resulted in disastrous failure for two reasons. First, despite Cornwallis' best efforts, neither he nor his men were able to catch Morgan before he crossed the Dan

¹ Fred Cook, "Struggle for the South," *From Troy to Entebbe*. Ed. John Arquilla. (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1996), 86.

² *Ibid.*

River. Second, and more telling, is that his units did not have the additional supplies needed to support their conventionally-oriented requirements. This shortcoming later resulted in Cornwallis' defeat by General Nathanael Greene at the Battle of Guilford Courthouse, when Cornwallis' troops were to again face a conventional enemy requiring a conventionally-oriented force structure and processes. Having transitioned his men to face an irregular, asymmetric enemy in Morgan, he did not have the essentials required to successfully transition his men back to symmetrically face the conventional forces of Greene.

Morgan and his men were accustomed to operating in a manner asymmetric to the contemporary practice of large, resource-intensive, Napoleonic forces. Cornwallis, however, in an attempt to transform his forces through the burning of the logistics necessary to support his element was ill-fitted for such operations, and by doing so figuratively burned with his supplies the essence of what gave his troops their identity; one which was not easily regained.³ This conundrum is as old as American warfare itself and has raised its head time and again throughout the history of the Army. Most recently this has been observed in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) where American General Purpose Forces (GPF) struggle to mold themselves into units capable of meeting the requirements needed to defeat insurgents and trans-national jihadists.

This situation begs the following questions: Is the U.S. Army today headed down the same path as Cornwallis in the American Revolution? And, by focusing on counter-insurgency (COIN) tactics while overlooking historical core-competencies associated with major combat operations (MCO), is the Army in essence 'burning the wagons' of MCO, and with that, the identity and expertise of its general purpose forces?

³ Idea initially introduced by Professor Hy Rothstein of the Naval Postgraduate School during *History of Special Operations* class session.

II. INTRODUCTION

There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct or more uncertain in its success than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things.

-Niccolo Machiavelli⁴

A. BACKGROUND

On March 20, 2003, the United States (U.S.) led “coalition of the willing”⁵ began its ground offensive en-route to Baghdad for the purpose of deposing Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and liberating the people of Iraq from his oppressive regime. A mere twenty days later, on April 9, 2003, Hussein’s Ba’athist government fell as crowds of cheering Iraqis gathered in the streets of their capital city to greet American forces.⁶ Pre-war planning seemingly presumed this euphoria of the liberated would persist, and that the Iraqi people would quickly be capable of self-governance. An example of this optimism is found in the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) PowerPoint presentation depicting the initial Phase IV troop strength of 270,000 personnel could incrementally be reduced to 5,000 within a thirty-two to forty-five months time span following the fall of Hussein’s regime.⁷ This stated timeline would have allowed for the vast majority of units to return to home station, and for the Army to resume “business as usual.” This scenario was not inconceivable given the rapid success of

⁴ Thinkexist.com, “Niccolo Machiavelli Quotes,” http://thinkexist.com/quotation/there_is_nothing_more_difficult_to_take_in_hand/14342.html (accessed May 15, 2008).

⁵ John King, “Bush: Join ‘coalition of willing,’” CNN.com, November 20, 2002, <http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/11/20/prague.bush.nato/> (accessed May 2, 2008).

⁶ Anthony Shadid, “Hussein’s Baghdad Falls,” Washington Post Foreign Service, April 10, 2003; <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&contentId=A1320-2003Apr9¬Found=true> (accessed May 2, 2008).

⁷ Joyce Battle and Thomas Blanton, “Top Secret Polo Steps,” The National Security Archive, February 14, 2007, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB214/index.htm> (accessed May 12, 2008).

Operation Desert Storm and the limited force requirement of the Balkan campaign which were both fresh in the minds of senior military and civilian Department of Defense leaders. However, more than five years and 4,000 casualties later we know this to have been a gross underestimation of actual events. Iraqi elation quickly gave way to the reality of lawlessness, internal strife, ethnic hostility between rival Sunni and Shi'ia tribes, and the introduction of Al-Qaeda in Iraq. Once assumed by government officials to be a relatively straightforward, conventional undertaking, the situation in Iraq quickly digressed into a complex, protracted irregular war (IW) requiring a sizeable and long-term U.S. ground force presence. As of July 2008, U.S. Army troop strength in Iraq numbered thirteen Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), reduced from a high of twenty during the "surge" period of the previous eighteen months.⁸ This unforeseen, prolonged, and modified force demand has placed great strain on the U.S. Army, its soldiers, and its ability to maintain units postured for conventional major combat operations (MCO).⁹ Virtually the entire Active Component, Reserve Component, and Army National Guard are presently being utilized to execute the Global War on Terror (GWOT), and a great deal of discussion regarding the Army's breaking point has arisen. Recently, Army Chief of Staff, General George Casey Jr. shed some light on this in his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee:

The cumulative effects of the last six-plus years at war have left our Army out of balance, consumed by the current fight and unable to do the things we know we need to do to properly sustain our all-volunteer force and restore our flexibility for an uncertain future.¹⁰

⁸ "Length of Tours, Number of BCTs in Iraq to be Reduced by July, Casey Says," *AUSA News*, April 01, 2008, <http://www.ausa.org/webpub/DeptAUSANews.nsf/byid/PGRH-7CMMPP> (accessed May 2, 2008).

⁹ The term Major Combat Operations is meant to describe combat operations between state-actors where tactical and material capabilities are similar, and are focused on offensive and defensive operations intended to defeat the designated military of a government for the purpose of forcing the capitulation of said government as well as its constituents.

¹⁰ "Length of Tours," *AUSA News*, April 01, 2008.

General Casey's comments regarding "...restor[ing] our flexibility for an uncertain future" highlights the current counterinsurgency (COIN)¹¹ centric focus that we believe is degrading the Army's ability to ready itself for full spectrum operations.¹² Gian Gentile reinforces this in his article, *Misreading the Surge Threatens U.S. Army's Conventional Capabilities*:

*The Israeli experience in Lebanon in the summer of 2006 should warn Americans against having an Army that has become so focused on irregular and counterinsurgency warfare that it can no longer fight large battles against a conventional enemy.*¹³

Additionally, Carl Munoz of *Inside the Air Force* notes in his article, *JFCOM Chief Says Training Too Focused on COIN, Irregular Warfare*:

*The outgoing head of U.S. Joint Forces Command this week joined a chorus of other high-ranking military officials who claim the Pentagon has become too enamored with counterinsurgency and irregular warfare as opposed to conventional military campaigns. "I think the lesson is partly learned, but not completely learned, that we really have to look at all the forms of warfare and not get so focused on one that we are not able to do the others," JFCOM chief Air Force Gen. Lance Smith.*¹⁴

These concerns are at the heart of this thesis. We concur with the senior military officials and believe that the Army, under the current system, cannot remain prepared for full spectrum operations providing that COIN continues to dominate the Mission Essential Task Lists (METL) and the training calendars of the Army *en bloc*.

¹¹ JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, defines counter-insurgency as: "Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. Also called COIN."

¹² Full Spectrum Operations is the Army's Operational Concept. FM 3-0, *Operations*, 3-1 states: "Army forces combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results."

¹³ Gian P. Gentile, "Misreading the Surge Threatens U.S. Army's Conventional Capabilities," *World Politics Review*. March 4, 2008, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=1715> (accessed May 3, 2008).

¹⁴ Carlo Munoz, "JFCOM Chief Says Training Too Focused on COIN, Irregular Warfare," *Inside the Air Force*, October 19, 2007, <http://integrator.hanscom.af.mil/2007/October/10252007/10252007-16.htm> (accessed April 29, 2008).

There is, however, a contrary vision within the Department of Defense (DoD) as noted by Josh White in his May 2008 *Washington Post* article, *Defense Secretary Urges Military to Mold Itself to Fight Iraq-Style Wars*. In this article White writes that:

*Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates implored the U.S. military Tuesday to prepare more for fighting future wars against insurgents and militias such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, rather than spending so much time and money preparing for conventional conflicts.*¹⁵

Additionally, Gates commented “the U.S. military ‘would be hard-pressed to launch a major conventional ground operation elsewhere in the world at this time,’ but he added: ‘Where would we sensibly do that?’”¹⁶

We understand that the dominant trend of future conflicts favors small, non-state actors who will seek to utilize asymmetric tactics rather than engage in traditional state-on-state, Cold War-era conflicts. We do, however, respectfully disagree with Secretary Gates apparent devaluing of the importance for the sustainment of conventional capabilities. Although the choice to conduct a “major conventional ground operation” is not currently sensible, this negates the reality that our adversaries will most likely act when we are least prepared. In a 2003 *Time* magazine article titled *Is the Army Stretched Too Thin?* authors Mark Thompson and Michael Duffy ask the impending question: “Where would the Pentagon turn if it had to rush additional combat troops to the 38th parallel? Might a lack of ready reinforcements force Washington to consider using nuclear weapons to save South Korea from defeat?”¹⁷ Kim Jong Il’s South Korea is just one example of numerous threats that we must be fully prepared to engage and defeat. However, others loom larger in the international spectrum, notably

¹⁵ Josh White, “Defense Secretary Urges Military to Mold Itself to Fight Iraq-Style Wars.” *The Washington Post*, May 14, 2008.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Mark Thompson and Michael Duffy, “Is the Army Stretched Too Thin?” *Time*, August 24, 2003.

Russia, Iran, and China. The United States' preoccupation on the GWOT has most recently become apparent at the strategic level when it failed to detect Russian troop movements into Georgia. According to one U.S. senior official, this was a result of "national technical means" being "pretty well consumed by Iraq, Afghanistan, and now Pakistan." The official continued to state: "I wouldn't say we were blind, I would say that we mostly were focused elsewhere, unlike during the Cold War, when we'd see a single Soviet armor battalion move. So, yes, the size and scope of the Russian move has come as something of a surprise."¹⁸

We concur with the need for having forces trained and competent in irregular warfare tactics, but feel there is a parallel and equally important need for troops prepared for major combat operations so that the United States' response to international crisis is not constrained by the availability of forces, and its ability to see one conflict through to completion is not interrupted by a need for troops elsewhere.

While strong evidence exists indicating the transferability of specific skills from irregular warfare to major combat operations, this does not apply to all skills necessary to win decisively. Transitioning the Army for MCO will require time, equipment, and manning, none of which are readily available outside the current Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process that is in every respect preoccupied with feeding the force rotation for the GWOT. This current process continues to posture the Army to be a uni-focused force, and the ongoing struggle to fulfill global commitments toward a singular effort resultantly stifles preparedness for *simultaneous dissimilar operations*.¹⁹ If the U.S. needed to act militarily in defense of a sovereign state such as Georgia or Taiwan while

¹⁸ Jonathan S. Landay, "U.S. Knew Georgia Trouble Was Coming, But Couldn't Stop It." *The McClatchy Newspapers*, August 11, 2008.

¹⁹ The authors define *simultaneous dissimilar operations* as operations conducted concurrently in a single or multi-theater setting, against both Regular and Irregular Forces and differing in terms of the nature of conflict (i.e., IW and MCO).

presently engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan, where would the forces and MCO expertise necessary to respond and sustain these operations derive?

The world is full of those who wish to do America harm, and will do so by whatever means available, particularly at the most inconvenient time (remembering that the enemy always gets a vote). Therefore, in our view, the prudent course of action is for the Army to maintain forces prepared to counter any possible future threat at all times.

B. PURPOSE/THESIS STATEMENT

The purpose of this study is to develop recommendations for change to the current Army force structure and the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process of general purpose forces²⁰ based on the Infantry, Heavy, and Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs). This includes both the Active Component and the Army National Guard. These recommendations provide for the Army the ability to meet current operational personnel requirements, while maintaining a force that is prepared to respond along the continuum of full spectrum operations. Although we believe the ARFORGEN process and the BCT organization are effective models for today's Army, modifications are prudent in order to optimize for both current and future fights.

Our thesis is as follows: Since the invasion of Iraq in March of 2003, general purpose forces have experienced a striking shift in focus from the conventional paradigm of skills required to win decisively in major combat operations, to the contemporary skill set necessary to succeed in the irregular warfare (IW)²¹ environment; in specific, the counterinsurgency environment of

²⁰ The IW JOC (2007) proposes the definition of general purpose forces as: "The regular armed forces of a country, other than nuclear forces and special operations forces that are organized, trained and equipped to perform a broad range of missions across the range of military operations."

²¹ JP 3-0 defines irregular warfare as: "A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population. Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will."

Iraq. This current focus, as noted by numerous senior-ranking military officials, is contributing to the distillation of the Army's ability to remain prepared for future conventional major combat operations. Although a great deal of emphasis on IW has been necessary to reduce tactical asymmetry²² between general purpose forces and contemporary irregular adversaries, continued neglect of historical core-competencies can potentially lead to a not-so-distant future when this asymmetry exists between U.S. forces and their conventional opponents.

It is nearly impossible to imagine asymmetry between the U.S. and an adversary on a material level, and we are not implying this. We are confident that the U.S. will possess a technological and material advantage well into the future. The question we are addressing is, if allowed to continue on the present path, will U.S. Army training reflect the tactical and technical ability to fight and win in any future war? Secretary Gates himself, in a speech given at the National Defense University on September 8, 2008 warned:

*Be modest about what military force can accomplish, and what technology can accomplish. The advances in precision, sensor, information and satellite technology have led to extraordinary gains in what the U.S. military can do...But also never neglect the psychological, cultural, political, and human dimensions of warfare, which is inevitably tragic, inefficient, and uncertain.*²³

Fortunately, our adversary in Iraq allowed us the time needed to adjust our BCTs to irregular warfare operations. It is not wise to assume, however, that this same grace period will be afforded to refocus our efforts while engaged in a high-intensity conflict environment opposite a formidable conventional threat.

²² The authors define asymmetric as: "1) Being unlike in a material sense; possessing or having access to a disproportionate amount of people and/or technology than an adversary. 2) Tactics, techniques, and/or procedures (TTPs) used by one or multiple actors in a conflict that seek to exploit an adversaries' perceived weaknesses while avoiding an adversaries' perceived strengths." The first portion of this definition is derived from email correspondence with Dr. Ivan Arreguin-Toft from 14 April 2008-17 April 2008. In his correspondence Dr. Arreguin-Toft wrote that his "own use of the term [asymmetric] was nearly mathematical, and followed that of the few earlier scholars (Mack, 1975; Paul 1994) who used the same concept. In my usage [Dr. Arreguin-Toft], the term literally means 'different'...and refers mainly to material power."

²³ Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, *U.S. Department of Defense*. Speech given at the National Defense University, September 29, 2008.

C. METHODOLOGY

The next chapter of this thesis (Chapter III) is a synopsis of present-day force structure and the ARFORGEN process that regulates the rotation of these forces through the refit, training, and deployment cycles. In this chapter, we qualitatively compare the Heavy, Stryker, and Infantry BCTs in order to inform the reader on the similarities, differences, strengths, and weaknesses of each. Following this, the ARFORGEN process is explained as it exists in its current form. Although this chapter may be superfluous for some, it is an essential step in establishing the framework for our argument, and serves as the foundation from which our recommendations for organizational reconstruction derive.

Chapter IV begins with a brief introduction to the reasons we feel the aforementioned force structure and ARFORGEN process should be modified to meet the demands of the contemporary operational environment. Supporting this is a quantitative analysis through a “zero-sum” game theory model between conflict type and force structure that provides us with the optimal ratio of BCTs dedicated to IW and MCO. Additionally, a quantitative timeline is depicted projecting the loss of MCO expertise within the Army given the current propensity for IW operations. Using the results of the zero-sum game, a recommendation for the transfer of HBCTs from the Active Component (AC) to the Army National Guard (ARNG) is introduced. Given the need to replace these HBCTs with the prescribed IW-to-MCO force ratio, a linear optimization program is utilized to determine the appropriate organizational construct (either IBCT or SBCT) based on our assessment of the suitability of each for the IW environment. In response to fiscal critics of this transformation, we quantitatively highlight the overall savings to the Army that this force structure modification will produce to counter procurement costs. Lastly in this section, we propose recommendations by which the majority of the soldiers of the former HBCTs can be utilized in non-traditional roles within the SBCT. Next, we apply this modified force within the context of two independent ARFORGEN models tailored for either IW or MCO. In this we have developed separate timelines for the AC and ARNG of both the

IW and MCO tracks, and a sample interaction of the two given a scenario where MCO transitions into an IW environment, as in the case of OIF. Finally, we provide brief recommendations to support the implementation of our proposal and to confront the challenges that will almost certainly arise.

Chapter V summarizes the conclusions we have drawn based on the findings of our research, and addresses issues derived from within this thesis that are worthy of further exploration. In this chapter we provide future students of this topic a roadmap for subsequent investigation. This will hopefully increase the likelihood of this proposal to gain greater visibility at the congressional level where U.S. policy-makers ultimately have the authority to implement this idea.

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III. THE CURRENT ARMY PHILOSOPHY

A. CURRENT ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE

Brigade Combat Teams or BCTs “are the Army’s basic tactical maneuver units, and the smallest combined arms units that can be committed independently.”²⁴ The BCT stems from the Army’s “plug and play” concept of modularity that allows it to “...better meet the challenges of the 21st century security environment and, specifically, jointly fight and win the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).”²⁵




Figure 1. Current BCT Organization

²⁴ Department of the Army, FM 3-90.6, *The Brigade Combat Team*, (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006), 2-1.

²⁵ Andrew Feickert, “US Army’s Modular Redesign: Issues for Congress,” CRS Report for Congress, May 5, 2006: 9, <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/67816.pdf> (accessed April 29, 2008).

At present, the Army is organized into forty-three Active Component BCTs and twenty-eight Army National Guard BCTs as depicted in Figure 1 above. The smaller size of the new BCT in comparison with those of the Division-era Army provides for increased numbers of available BCTs to commanders in order to support the high operational tempo of the contemporary environment (Figure 2).²⁶ As stated by Army Chief of Staff, General Peter Schoomaker, the goals for the new brigade design are to:

Increase the number of combat brigades available to the Army while maintaining combat effectiveness that is equal to or better than that of current division BCTs.

Create smaller standardized modules to meet the varied demands of regional combatant commanders, and to reduce joint planning and execution complexities.

Redesign brigades to perform as integral parts of the Joint team. This makes the BCTs more capable in their basic ground close combat role. They are able to benefit from other service support and to contribute more to other service partners.²⁷

There are three types of Brigade Combat Teams; they are the armored/mechanized Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT), the lightly armored/motorized Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), and the Airborne, Air Assault and Light elements of the Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), organized as depicted in Figure 3.²⁸ In addition to their maneuver elements, each BCT has a fires battalion, a support battalion, and a reconnaissance squadron. The combat support units of the HBCT and IBCT are the brigade special troops battalion (BSTB), whereas the SBCT has separate support companies under brigade control.²⁹

²⁶ FM 3-90.6, *The Brigade Combat Team*, XVI.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid., 2-7.




Figure 2. Army Division to Unit of Action (UA) BCT Concept³⁰




Figure 3. HBCT, IBCT, and SBCT Organizational Chart³¹

³⁰ "Modular Forces," *US Army Training and Doctrine Command*, August 7, 2006, http://www.tradoc.army.mil/pao/Web_specials/Leadership_of_Futures/modforce.htm (accessed May 5, 2008).

³¹ Ibid.

1. The Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT)

The Heavy Brigade replaces the separate armored, mechanized, cavalry, and balanced brigades of the previous division and corps organization. The HBCT is organized around two Combined Arms Battalions (CABs), each comprised of two infantry companies, and two armor companies (Figure 4). The CABs fight integrated with one another, and are supported by sniper teams, a scout platoon, and organic 120mm mortars. In addition, the CAB has an organic engineer company consisting of three line platoons and one support platoon. The mission of the CAB is “to close with, and destroy or defeat enemy forces within the full spectrum of modern combat operations.”³²

The reconnaissance squadron of the HBCT provides intelligence to commanders while having the ability to defend itself against most threats. The reconnaissance squadron is made up of one Headquarters and Headquarters Troop (HHT), and three Ground Reconnaissance Troops, each equipped with M3 Cavalry Fighting Vehicles and M1114 armored HUMVEES.³³

The HBCT fires battalion is composed of two batteries of 155mm self-propelled Paladins, and both the Q-36 and Q-37 counter-fire radars as well as four counter-mortar radars.

The HBCT is the best protected, but slowest to deploy of the three BCTs. Due to its armored and mechanized platforms, it is the best option for opposing an armored enemy threat.³⁴ HBCT strength is approximately 3,800 soldiers.³⁵

³² “Modular Forces,” *US Army Training and Doctrine Command*, August 7, 2006, http://www.tradoc.army.mil/pao/Web_specials/Leadership_of_Futures/modforce.htm (accessed May 5, 2008), A2.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid., A1.

³⁵ Ibid., A2.




Figure 4. HBCT Organizational Chart to Company Level³⁶

HBCT Capabilities	HBCT Limitations
Conducting sustained operations in most environments	High dependence on radio communications
Accomplishing very rapid movement and deep penetrations	Restricted mobility in highly mountainous terrain or dense forests
Conducting security operations	High usage rate of consumable supplies, particularly class III, V, and IX
Conducting offensive and defensive operations	Vulnerability to mines and antitank weapons
Maintaining the ability to integrate light or SOF	Footprint is usually larger than a lighter force
Possessing mobile, protected firepower	Fratricide of light forces is higher due to the inability to determine friend or foe unless mounted
Providing digital SA down to vehicle-level	HBCT staff does not have an S3 air section to plan and oversee air assault operations
Performing company-sized air assaults	Possesses no organic gap crossing capability

Table 1. HBCT Capabilities and Limitations³⁷

³⁶ "Modular Forces," *US Army Training and Doctrine Command*, August 7, 2006, http://www.tradoc.army.mil/pao/Web_specials/Leadership_of_Futures/modforce.htm (accessed May 5, 2008), A1.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, A3-A4.

2. The Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT)

The SBCT is organized around three infantry battalions, and although not as armored as the HBCT, it is easier to deploy while still offering greater mobility than the IBCT (Figure 5). The SBCT is the largest of the BCTs with approximately 4,000 soldiers.

Each of the SBCT rifle battalions has three rifle companies, and each company has three rifle platoons, organic 60mm and 120mm mortars, a sniper team, and a Mobile Gun System (MGS) platoon with three MGS vehicles. The Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC) provides additional firepower with one 81mm/120mm mortar section, two sniper teams, and a reconnaissance platoon.³⁸ The SBCT also has a reconnaissance squadron composed of five highly-mobile troops. These five troops consist of one HHT, a surveillance troop, and three vehicle-equipped reconnaissance platoons. These reconnaissance troops are organized into three platoons of four vehicles, and a mortar section with two mounted 120mm mortars. The surveillance troop possesses numerous ground-based and air-based sensors to include the Prophet vehicle and unmanned aerial reconnaissance platforms.

The SBCT's fires battalion has eighteen 155mm howitzers, and the Headquarters and Headquarters Battery (HHB) comes equipped with the Q-36 and Q-37 radars. Borrowing from the strengths of the HBCT and IBCT, the SBCT additionally has a company of engineers for mobility, and an anti-tank (AT) company with 9 anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) vehicles.³⁹

³⁸ "Modular Forces," *US Army Training and Doctrine Command*, August 7, 2006, http://www.tradoc.army.mil/pao/Web_specials/Leadership_of_Futures/modforce.htm (accessed May 5, 2008), A7.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, A7-A8.




Figure 5. SBCT Organizational Chart to Company Level⁴⁰

SBCT Capabilities	SBCT Limitations
Three infantry battalions for maneuver (vs. only two in the HBCT and IBCT)	The SBCT does not have the firepower or inherent protection of HBCTs
Infantry battalions contain organic armor in their MGS platoons	The SBCT requires more aircraft to deploy than an IBCT
In-theater mobility	The BSB does not have FSCs for each maneuver battalion
Lower usage rate of class III supplies than the HBCT, with nearly the same mobility	Possesses no organic gap crossing capability
Greater survivability than an IBCT	There is no BSTB for C2 of brigade troops
Ability to conduct forced entry or early entry operations	
RS with organic HUMINT Soldiers	

Table 2. SBCT Capabilities and Limitations⁴¹

3. The Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT)

The IBCT is the “light” force and replaces the Airborne, Air Assault, and Light infantry division organizations. Each IBCT is designed around two infantry battalions, but additionally has a reconnaissance squadron, a fires battalion, a brigade support battalion, and a brigade special troops battalion (Figure 6). The primary function of the IBCT is in the role of the rapid deployment element.

⁴⁰ “Modular Forces,” *US Army Training and Doctrine Command*, August 7, 2006, http://www.tradoc.army.mil/pao/Web_specials/Leadership_of_Futures/modforce.htm (accessed May 5, 2008), A7-A8.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, A9.

Through its airborne component, it is capable of forcible entry⁴² operations, and once on the ground, is prepared for the offensive immediately.⁴³ Due to its “light” nature, the IBCT is the component designed to operate in restricted terrain inaccessible or unfeasible for the SBCT and IBCT, and is best suited for “high-tempo offensive operations against conventional and unconventional forces.”⁴⁴ Each IBCT has approximately 3,400 soldiers.

Every IBCT infantry battalion is comprised of a HHC, three rifle companies, and a weapons company. The Headquarters Company provides a scout platoon, 81mm and 120mm mortar platoon, and a sniper squad, while the rifle companies have three rifle platoons, a weapons squad, and a 60mm mortar section. The weapons company is the mounted asset of the IBCT, and is made up of four mounted assault platoons with three anti-tank vehicles each.

The IBCT reconnaissance squadron is made up of two armored troops (M1114) and one dismounted troop, deployed by either fixed wing or rotary wing aircraft. The IBCT fires battalion has two batteries of eight 105mm towed artillery pieces, one, Q-36 radar, and four counter-mortar radars.⁴⁵

⁴² JP 1-02 defines forcible entry as: “Seizing and holding of a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition.”

⁴³ FM 3-90.6, *The Brigade Combat Team*, A1.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, A6.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*




Figure 6. IBCT Organizational Chart to Company Level⁴⁶

IBCT Capabilities	IBCT Limitations
Conducting small-unit operations	The IBCT does not have the firepower, mobility, or inherent protection of HBCTs
Conducting operations with armored, mechanized, or wheeled forces	The two maneuver battalions of the IBCT move predominately by foot; organic vehicles must move either Soldiers or supplies. The BSB has only enough trucks to transport two rifle companies
Conducting operations with SOF	Infantry Soldiers are especially vulnerable to enemy fires and CBRN attacks while Soldiers are moving
Taking part in amphibious operations	With only two maneuver battalions, options are limited for retaining capabilities for a pursuit, exploitation, or reserve force
Maintaining the ability to conduct forced entry or early entry operations	Possesses no organic gap crossing capability
Conducting air assault, air mobile, or airborne operations	Soldiers of the IBCT require USAF support for airborne assault
Maintaining BSB/FSC transportation assets that allow 4 rifle companies to be truck-borne for any operation	For a brigade-level air assault, the IBCT requires the support of at least two combat aviation brigades
Maintaining a RS consisting of both mounted and dismounted personnel	

Table 3. IBCT Capabilities and Limitations⁴⁷

⁴⁶ FM 3-90.6, *The Brigade Combat Team*, A4.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, A6.

B. CURRENT ARMY FORCE GENERATION (ARFORGEN)

Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) is the means by which the Army refits, trains and deploys its units. According to Addendum H of the 2007 U.S. Army Posture Statement, ARFORGEN is the “structured progression of increased unit readiness over time resulting in recurring periods of availability of trained, ready, and cohesive units.”⁴⁸ The stated purpose of ARFORGEN “is to achieve a sustained, more predictable posture to generate trained and ready modular forces.”⁴⁹ In short, ARFORGEN is a cyclical process that categorizes units, at varying degrees of preparedness, into one of three pools (reset and train, ready, and available) in order to maintain a prepared and competent Army capable of sustaining protracted force requirements (Figure 7).

ARFORGEN functions with BCTs in each pool executing a specific, prescribed set of tasks, each cumulatively resulting in a unit’s preparedness for a response to global requirements. The “reset and train” pool is comprised of units that have redeployed from operations and are focused on manning, equipment readiness, professional military education, and individual/collective training. Units in this pool are not eligible for combat operations, but can be tasked with homeland defense-related requirements. The “ready” pool units are focused on upcoming, mission-specific collective training as prescribed in their directed Mission Essential Task List (METL). These units continue training on individual and collective tasks and take part in Unit Mission Readiness Exercises (MREs) at one of the Army’s three Combat Training Centers (CTCs), while brigade, division, and corps staffs synchronize their planning efforts during Command Post Exercises (CPX) at the Battle Command Training Program. These ready units, however, can be deployed in support of a troop surge. Units in the “available” pool are fully prepared logistically and operationally for deployment, and are either awaiting deployment, or are deployed in support of full-spectrum

⁴⁸ Honorable Francis J. Harvey and General Peter Schoomaker, “A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2007,” Addendum H, February 14, 2007.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

operations.⁵⁰ The ARFORGEN process is centered on the modular BCT concept and includes all Active Component (AC), Reserve Component (RC), and Army National Guard (ARNG) forces.⁵¹ For the purpose of this thesis, however, we have chosen not to address the support brigades of the RC, but rather concentrate on the maneuver elements of the Heavy, Stryker and Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) of the AC and ARNG.




Figure 7. Army Force Generation Model⁵²

⁵⁰ FM 3-0, *Operations*, 3-1 states that “Full Spectrum Operations is the Army’s operational concept that combines Offensive, Defensive, Stability and Civil Support operations.”

⁵¹ Honorable Francis J. Harvey and General Peter Schoomaker, “A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2007,” Addendum H, February 14, 2007.

⁵² Ibid.

According to the current ARFORGEN model illustrated in Figure 7, the Active Component (AC) has a three-year cycle in which the first year is in the reset and train pool, the second year is in the ready pool, while the third year is spent in the available pool where BCTs are prepared to conduct, or are conducting, worldwide deployment. Conversely, the Army National Guard will spend four years in the reset and train pool in order to achieve the four-to-one dwell time ratio required by the Webb-Hagel Dwell Time Amendment attached to the 2007 Defense Authorization Bill.⁵³ In the fifth year, BCTs in the ready pool are eligible for worldwide deployment, while those forces in year six will either deploy or engage in homeland defense or homeland security missions.

It is the intent of Army leaders that the ARFORGEN process “reduce[s] uncertainty for soldiers, families, and the communities that support installations, improve[s] availability of trained and prepared forces for Combatant Commanders,” and “generate[s] a continuous level of BCTs, augmented by all required supporting organizations...”⁵⁴

⁵³ Senator Jim Webb (D-VA) Press Release, “Bi-Partisan Legislation Calls for Adequate Dwell Time Between Overseas Deployments,” <http://webb.senate.gov/newsroom/record.cfm?id=278436> (accessed September 4, 2008).

⁵⁴ Honorable Pete Geren and General George W. Casey Jr., “A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2008,” Addendum E, February 26, 2008.

IV. RETHINKING THE CURRENT ARMY PHILOSOPHY

We have to put aside the comfortable ways of thinking and planning, take risks and try new things so that we can prepare our forces to deter and defeat adversaries that have not yet emerged to challenge us.

-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld⁵⁵

A. REASONS FOR CHANGE

The previously described existing Army force structure and ARFORGEN model have proven themselves adequate in the short-term for concurrent, similar campaigns as evidenced by the difficult, yet acceptable sustainment of operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. However, we have identified two major roadblocks to the Army's ability to conduct simultaneous dissimilar operations. The first of these is the Army's inability to transition itself from irregular warfare to major combat operations given its total force requirement in the current operational environment. The second is the eventual loss of expertise in MCO due to the continued focus on IW operations. Each of these will be addressed individually in the following paragraphs.

In the next step of our argument, we utilize a two-by-two, zero-sum game theory model in order to illustrate a force structure and force orientation with dual capabilities, optimized to engage both irregular and conventional threats either separately or simultaneously. This is necessary to quantitatively justify the best possible force ratio between IW and MCO elements. Following this, we propose a timeline displaying the projected loss of MCO expertise within the battalion and brigade command and battle staffs if the Army continues its paradigm for fixating on a singular *niche* of warfare. We have chosen the brigade and battalion

⁵⁵ Donald Rumsfeld, speech at National Defense University, Washington, D.C., January 31, 2002, from U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (*Public Affairs*), <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s20020131-secdef.html> (accessed April 24, 2008).

commands and battle staffs due to their roles as the primary command and control elements responsible for the planning and execution of training for subordinate elements. We further argue that while some cognitive skills learned from one style of warfare (IW/COIN) may be transferable to another (MCO), mastery of skills, in particular those of maneuver commanders and field-grade executive and operations officers, should not be left to chance. Field-grade officers and senior non-commissioned officers must be grounded tactically and technically in their respective form of war, be it conventional or irregular. While conducting this study, we ask the question: At what point will brigade and battalion commanders and their respective staffs be so ingrained in IW that they lose mastery of MCO?


Finally, we cover in depth our proposal for change to both the Army force structure and the ARFORGEN process based on the results of the aforementioned analysis.

1. Game Theory

Depicted in Figure 8 is a zero-sum game between two rational actors; the first being the U.S. and its choice of force orientation, and the second being adversaries of the U.S., and their choice of conflict in which to engage.⁵⁶ There are two choices for both force orientation and conflict type: irregular warfare (IW), and major combat operations (MCO). When determining the ordinal numbers associated with the relationship between force orientation and conflict type, we assessed the outcomes of the intersection, or strategic interaction of each on a scale from 1-10, with 1 being the worst outcome and 10 being the best. Due to the United States' distinct advantage in material strength, technical proficiency, and the symmetrical interaction of MCO vs. MCO, this is the best possible

⁵⁶ According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "Game theory is the study of the ways in which strategic interaction among rational players produce outcomes with respect to the preferences (or utilities) of those players, none of which might have been intended by any of them." *Game Theory*, published January 25, 1997, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/game-theory/> (accessed September 25, 2008).

situation at present, and is therefore a value of 10. Next on the scale is IW vs. IW with a value of 5. As in the previous category, this is a symmetrical scenario, but is valued less because failure at IW against an irregular threat arguably does not carry with it the implication of a failure versus an adversarial nation-state, and the overall cost in both men and material is assumed to be less. The third scenario is an MCO force in an IW campaign, much like the American Army's experience in Iraq following the fall of Baghdad, or the continuing Russian debacle in Chechnya (Appendix A). Although the cost of this situation can be high both economically and politically, it still remains less costly than the final scenario of this model, where an IW force finds itself engaged in major combat operations, as in the case of Israel during the July War of 2006 (See Appendix A and Figure 8).



⁵⁷ Miroslav Feix, "Game Theory [electronic resource]: Toolkit and Workbook for Defense Analysis Students," Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2007.

Applying these aforementioned values in Miroslav Feix's game theory toolkit, we found that the nine out of eleven combat scenarios will most likely be irregular, with the remaining two focused on MCO (Star "1" in Figure 8). Based on this, the optimal force structure for the Army is seven-elevenths, or sixty-four percent of its force dedicated to IW, and thirty-six percent of its force dedicated to MCO (Star "2" in Figure 8). Taking these fractions and applying them to the actual number of Army BCTs, this translates to forty-nine of seventy-six BCTs dedicated to IW, and the remaining twenty-seven focused on MCO. In subparagraph B of this chapter, we will discuss how this can be implemented for optimization of the force.

2. Brigade / Battalion Command and Staff Timeline

Since the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the Army's Cold War-era paradigm for MCO has shifted in favor of IW operations necessary to combat insurgencies and the emerging threat from trans-national jihadist networks. This shift, although needed, should not be in the form of a zero-sum game between MCO and IW. We suggest that there is a need to balance the force between IW and MCO in order to maintain expertise for both within the Army. Figure 9 depicts five separate commissioned officer year groups (YG) based on that year group's rank and position at the time of this shift. The red line separating years 2003 and 2004 represents the point in the fourth quarter of fiscal year (FY) 2003 when it is estimated that all major ground operations resembling MCO in Iraq had ceased, and the programs of instruction (POIs) of the combat training centers (CTCs) as well as the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) adopted an IW focus.




Figure 9. Projected Timeline of MCO Expertise Loss

For all year groups, year zero depicts commissioning and initial training. Years 1-3 are spent as a Lieutenant, years 4-9 as a Captain, years 10-15 as a Major, years 16-21 as a Lieutenant Colonel, and years 22-26 as a Colonel, with the officers term of service estimated to end in retirement following the twenty-sixth year. As is shown for YG 1980 (Brigade Commanders in 2004), the majority of their experience is grounded in MCO, with only the three final years of

their career spent conducting irregular operations. For YG 1986 (Battalion Commanders in 2004), their formative years spent as company grade officers were saturated in MCO, leaving them ill-prepared for IW as battalion commanders, but better prepared than their predecessors for IW as brigade commanders. Although approximately balanced in MCO and IW, the officers of YG 1992 (Brigade and Battalion staff officers in 2004) are at a disadvantage in terms of planning for IW operations, but represent the high water mark for the retention of knowledge in MCO due to the conventional focus of the Army at the time of their company command. YG 1998 (Company Commanders in 2004) had perhaps the most difficult company commands of any year group due to their time in command having been spent transitioning to a style of warfare different than they experienced as company Executive Officers and Platoon Leaders.

We estimate that YG 2004 (newly-commissioned Lieutenants in 2004) is the first YG of officers to have no experience with, or frame of reference for MCO, as little of their training and none of their real-world missions have included MCO. Based on this timeline and given the Army's continued propensity for IW, we have estimated that any knowledge sufficient to transform the force from IW back to MCO will be devoid by 2030 with the retirement of YG 2004 officers.

Our following recommendations illustrate a proposed course of action which we believe will allow the Army to avoid this perilous situation by maintaining forces capable of meeting the challenges of our dynamic environment across the range of full-spectrum operations.

B. PROPOSED MODIFIED ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE

Currently the Army has forty-three active component BCTs of which eighteen are IBCTs, six are SBCTs, and nineteen are HBCTs. The Army National Guard has twenty-eight BCTs of which nineteen are IBCTs, one is a SBCT, and eight are HBCTs. Combined, the AC and ARNG have a total of thirty-seven IBCTs, seven SBCTs, and twenty-seven HBCTs (Figure 10). Although HBCTs have performed well in the IW environment, we are of the

opinion that their success is a consequence of strong, adaptable leaders, and not its suitability for the IW environment. Additionally, due to the high operational tempo, and thus little time for maintenance and training other than theater specific tasks, the HBCT's ability to remain prepared for MCO as the world's preeminent armored and mechanized force is being hindered. Due to this, our first recommendation is to transfer the vehicular capabilities from seven AC HBCTs to ARNG units that are presently organized in the IBCT and SBCT configuration (Figure 11). This transfer of HBCT equipment to the ARNG allows one AC HBCT to assume the organization of a SBCT, and to receive transfer of Stryker vehicles from the single existing ARNG SBCT.




Figure 10. Current BCT Organization

Four of the remaining six disbanded HBCTs will organize as SBCTs and require the procurement of new Stryker Brigade equipment. The remaining two

BCTs of the seven will organize as IBCTs and procure either M1114 High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) or Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles.

As will be shown later in this paper under the proposed MCO ARFORGEN model, it will be possible for these newly-acquired ARNG tracked vehicles to dwell at home station for longer periods than their active counterparts, and therefore serve as a deterrent to conventional opponents and remain prepared for response to armored threats.




Figure 11. Proposed Transfer of HBCTs from AC to ARNG

The reasons for changing to the SBCT and IBCT Tables of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) are: 1) this allows these BCTs to deploy with greater ease and to be more responsive to global threats, 2) the equipment associated with the IBCT and SBCT is less intrusive and better suited for the IW

environment, 3) the wheeled vehicles associated with the IBCT and SBCT experience less wear on the paved surfaces of the urban environment than their tracked HBCT counterparts and have an overall decreased operating cost, and 4) both the IBCT and the SBCT possess enhanced and markedly more robust Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities suitable for the information realm of the IW environment (Figure 12).




Figure 12. BCT Environmental Compatibility Chart⁵⁸

⁵⁸ Major General Richard P. Formica, Director of Army Force Management, "The Army: Force Structure – Current to Future," December 3, 2007, <http://www.crprogroupp.com/eventnotebook/Shaping%20the%20Force%20for%20web/Thursday%20Dec%206/Doctrine%20and%20Oranization%20Panel/MG%20Richard%20Formica.pdf> (accessed September 18, 2008).

It is understood that there will be procurement challenges for the states during the transfer of this equipment, and funding issues for the AC in obtaining the SBCT capabilities, but we feel all of this can be overcome once the need for this is recognized by military decision-makers and gains support from state and federal law-makers. Arguments against this transformation will likely be hinged on the loss of survivability of the M1, M2, and M3 platforms, but we feel this is mitigated by the proven combat record of the Stryker and M1114 HMMWV, as well as the introduction of new vehicles like the MRAP; all of which are wheeled versus tracked platforms and better suited for un-intrusive, urban, IW operations. Additional opposition to this will likely come from the Armor and Mechanized Infantry communities that have long and distinguished histories based in platforms such as the M1 and M2/M3. These Armor and Infantry soldiers from the former HBCTs should find it simple to transition to positions within the Mobile Gun System (MGS), Weapons, and Reconnaissance elements of the SBCT and IBCT, and progress through the IW track for the remainder of their careers. This should be a fairly smooth process as the TO&Es of the BCTs are not drastically different. Additionally, the SBCT is a mounted force, and the IBCT's Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Squadron as well as the Infantry battalion's weapons companies are all mounted elements with existing positions coded for Armor officers (See Figure 13 and Appendix C). As one example to better utilize all of the officers, non-commissioned officers, and junior enlisted soldiers of the former HBCTs, we propose that excess 19Ds and 19Ks, in lieu of 11Bs, fill the positions within the Stryker vehicle crews (Driver/TC), thus allowing 11Bs typically tied to those platforms to act in a dismounted role. A second example of this is utilizing the seventy-one 88M Specialists and Privates First Class, and thirty-three 88M Sergeants per HBCT that are surplus to serve as Stryker vehicle drivers. Additional opportunities for the utilization of excess personnel in the filling of positions throughout the SBCT that would otherwise be vacant are illustrated by the comparisons of BCT Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs) in Appendix C.

As depicted in Figure 13, we estimate the effectiveness of the IBCT to be twice that of the HBCT, and the effectiveness of the SBCT to be four times that of the HBCT in terms of suitability for irregular warfare. We arrived at these values through an assessment of the BCTs as viewed through the lens of the U.S. Army's War-fighting Functions; Movement and Maneuver, Fires, Intelligence, Sustainment, Command and Control, and Protection. In each case, we assess the SBCT to be favored on all accounts, and the IBCT superior to the HBCT in terms of Movement and Maneuver, Intelligence, Sustainment, and Command and Control. We also assume with the introduction of the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles into the IBCT, that the gap in protection between the IBCT and HBCT will be negligible. These values, though ordinal and subjective, signify our best effort to represent the capabilities of each BCT in numerical form. Using these values, we then conducted a linear optimization program which, based on the values assigned to IBCTs and SBCTs, indicates that, in order to optimize the structure of the IW component, the dominant strategy is the creation of three SBCTs and two IBCTs. According to the linear program, we can only create two complete IBCTs, and three complete SBCTs from the pool of soldiers made available by the dissolution of the seven HBCTs. We have, however, calculated the number of personnel necessary to create the two additional SBCTs needed to fulfill the ratio of IW to MCO forces indicated by the game theory model mentioned above. As can be seen in Figure 13, the total force transformation will result in a deficit of 1,559 soldiers. The military occupational specialties that are affected greatest are those of the lower-enlisted and junior NCO ranks from the maneuver elements. The task of filling these critical shortages will most likely be assumed by the U.S. Army Human Resources Command (HRC) through the creative use of enlistment and re-enlistment bonuses and incentives, or reclassification through the Bonus Extension and Retraining (BEAR) Program.

HBCT TO IBCT/SBCT LINEAR OPTIMIZATION PROGRAM									
MAXIMIZE X1 + X2 WHERE X1 = IBCT and X2 = SBCT									
MAXIMIZE	X1	X2	ANSWER	RHS	EXCESS	NEEDED IOT CREATE TWO MORE SBCTs	SURPLUS/ DEFICIT		
	IBCT	SBCT							
TOTAL SOLDIERS	2	4	17,062,263.2						
	IBCT:	3400	4000	20169.1	<=	26600	6441	8000	1569
MANEUVER OFFICERS									
	LTC:	6	6	32.2	<=	42	10	12	-2
MOS: 01A, 02A, 02B, 02C, 03A, 05A, 11A, 19A, 19B, 19C	MAJ:	12	10	58.1	<=	77	19	20	-1
	CPT:	29	30	158.9	<=	203	44	60	-16
	LT:	56	76	364.0	<=	364	0	152	-152
MANEUVER ENLISTED									
	CSM/SGM:	5	5	26.9	<=	35	8	50	-3
MOS: 11B, 11Z, 19D, 19K, 19Z (Plus excess 88M E3-E5)	1SG/MSG:	18	19	98.8	<=	140	40	38	2
	SFC:	46	59	288.2	<=	315	27	118	-91
	SSG:	122	157	765.9	<=	1106	340	314	76
	SGT:	185	431	1771.0	<=	1771	0	862	-862
	SPC/PFC:	781	1044	5026.2	<=	5089	63	2088	-2025
FIRES OFFICERS									
	LTC:	2	1	7.6	<=	14	6	2	4
MOS: 13A	MAJ:	3	3	16.1	<=	21	5	6	-1
	CPT:	13	14	73.0	<=	77	4	28	-34
	LT:	23	32	152.0	<=	175	23	64	-81
FIRES ENLISTED									
	1SG/MSG:	6	6	32.2	<=	42	10	12	-2
MOS: 13B, 13D, 13F, and 13Z	SFC:	19	24	117.9	<=	133	15	48	-33
	SSG:	38	40	219.1	<=	268	56	80	-31
	SGT:	76	75	405.1	<=	427	22	150	-128
	SPC/PFC:	175	219	1079.0	<=	1463	384	438	-98
DECISION VARIABLES:	2.211988884	3.159587138	2	IBCTs CAN BE CREATED	3	SBCTs CAN BE CREATED			

Figure 13. HBCT to IBCT/SBCT Linear Optimization Program

A point of contention to this transformation will be the means for funding the procurement of new vehicles for the five SBCTs and two IBCTs. We believe our proposed modified force structure and the new ARFORGEN cycle discussed later in this chapter partially address this concern. Presently, four ARNG BCTs are deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan in support of OIF and OEF. We propose removing two of these ARNG BCTs from the current rotation, leaving the total ARNG force requirement at two BCTs in support of IW (Figure 18). We estimate that by doing this, the annual savings to the Army for individual pay alone (not including vehicle operating and maintenance costs as well as overall cost of deployment) would be in excess of \$362 million dollars. Each new SBCT

requires 317 Stryker vehicles at a cost of approximately \$1.42 million each.⁵⁹ Without the removal of these ARNG BCTs, the total cost to the Army per SBCT for new Stryker vehicles would be approximately \$450 million. However, with the removal of the ARNG BCTs, the overall reduced cost to the Army will be approximately \$88 million per SBCT. In summary, each new SBCT's vehicles will only cost the Army \$88 million as opposed to \$450 million (See Appendix B). Additionally, we propose the transformation of two BCTs to the IBCT organization; subsequently, the procurement of the MRAP vehicle is a logical supplement. For argument sake, we assume a similar number of MRAPs will be needed to transport the smaller number of personnel in an IBCT due to the reduced carrying capacity of the MRAP as compared with the larger SBCT's Stryker vehicles. Assuming the IBCT will require approximately 317 MRAPs at roughly \$500,000 each, the total procurement cost per IBCT will be an estimated \$158.5 million.⁶⁰ Considering the previously mentioned per annum \$362 million savings with the removal of two ARNG BCTs, the resultant net gain to the Army will be nearly \$204 million per IBCT (Appendix B). Though there will be an initial cost to the Army of over \$2.5 billion, the removal of these ARNG BCTs offsets this fiscal challenge in a period of just over seven years. The financial aspects of this transformation are critical and will surely be a major consideration; however, we believe the suitability of these armored vehicles for the IW environment and the savings in terms of lives due to the increased survivability of these combat-proven platforms are of greater importance.

By 2013 the Army plans to integrate five additional BCTs to the AC, which will bolster the total number of AC BCTs to forty-eight, while the ARNG BCT

⁵⁹ U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to Congressional Committees, *GAO-03-671: Military Transformation: Army's Evaluation of Stryker and M-113A3 Infantry Carrier Vehicles Provided Sufficient Data for Statutorily Mandated Comparison* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GAO, May 2003).

⁶⁰ Peter Eisler, "The Truck the Pentagon Wants and the Firm That Makes It," *USA Today*, October 2, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/military/2007-08-01-force-protection-mraps_N.htm (accessed September 17, 2008).

count will remain unchanged at twenty-eight.⁶¹ Under our proposal, the forty-eight AC BCTs will be divided into twenty IBCTs (increased from eighteen), eleven SBCTs (increased from six), and five planned BCTs (either IBCT or SBCT), and will serve as the proponent for irregular warfare. Furthermore, the current nineteen HBCTs will be decreased to twelve through the transfer of tracked vehicles to the ARNG, and will serve as the MCO proponent (Figure 11).

We have chosen the BCT organization depicted in Figure 14 for three particular reasons. The first reason is an attempt to keep HBCTs “divisionally” intact under the 1st Armored Division, the 1st Cavalry Division, and the 3rd Infantry Division due to the existing infrastructure at their assigned posts which are conditioned to support mechanized and armor maneuver units. The second is in an effort to keep intact the habitual relationship between air assault units, airborne units, and their aviation assets (i.e., 82nd ABN, 173rd ABN, and 101st AASLT) in order to maintain the Army’s forcible-entry capability. The final reason is an attempt to overlay SBCTs with HBCTs (i.e., 1st and 4th ID) due to these units’ inherent knowledge of vehicular-based operations and familiarity with high-mobility platforms.

⁶¹ Honorable Francis J. Harvey and General Peter Schoomaker, “A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2007,” Addendum H, February 14, 2007.




Figure 14. Proposed 2013 BCT Organization

C. PROPOSED MODIFIED ARMY FORCE GENERATION

As depicted in Figure 7, the current ARFORGEN model places all units, regardless of organizational construct, within a unitary cycle for the purpose of sustaining operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. For reasons previously mentioned, we submit that this is the wrong approach, and therefore propose the creation of two separate tracks. The first track is comprised of HBCTs and is focused primarily on MCO, while the second is made up of IBCTs and SBCTs and is focused primarily on the execution of IW. Under our “Proposed MCO ARFORGEN Model” (Figure 15), the HBCTs of the AC will progress through three phases, each lasting twelve months.




Figure 15. Proposed MCO ARFORGEN Model

The first of these phases is the “Reset and Phase I Tasks” period where units will focus on the following tasks:

- Change of command
- Mandatory block leave
- Permanent Change of Station (PCS) movement
- Equipment maintenance and deep refit (Level 5)
- OES/NCOES professional development
- Local/TRADOC schools (CLS, paramedic, Ranger, AASLT, ABN)
- Civilian education
- Individual soldier skills/small unit collective tasks

The second phase is for the execution of “Phase II Tasks” where units engage in collective training as prescribed by their directed METL. These tasks include:

- Combined live-fire exercises
- Situational training exercises
- External evaluations
- Battalion command-post exercises

This phase will culminate in Combat Training Center (CTC) rotations for the battalions and Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) rotations for brigade staffs focused on kinetic, force-on-force, conventional operations.

Upon assumption of the third phase units are proven to be “Fully Mission Capable” (FMC) and are eligible for deployment or in-fact, deployed. The proposed timeline for AC forces in this cycle is depicted in Figure 16.




Figure 16. Proposed AC MCO Timeline

Although the Army National Guard appears to follow a similar cycle to the active units; this is not the case. As in Figure 17 below, if units are actively engaged in MCO they will conduct the same Phase I tasks as the active component, but over a two-year time period. They will likewise perform Phase II tasks in years three through five, culminating in either an active component-observed and controlled external evaluation (EXEVAL), or a rotation to one of the CTCs. For Guardsmen not actively engaged in MCO, and therefore not requiring a four-year dwell time, Phase I and II tasks will be completed over the course of a two-year span; however, in the second year, these units will be subject to assignment to U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) in support of Homeland Defense. The exception to this is one BCT tasked to operate in the Republic of Korea (ROK), due to the symmetry of MCO forces versus the composition of North Korea's military. This unit will require a four-year dwell time upon the conclusion of its tour and therefore will be desynchronized with its original cohort.




Figure 17. Proposed ARNG MCO Timeline

Overall, this will provide the Army a sustained presence in the ROK for an indefinite period of time if not engaged in MCO. If, however, engaged in MCO, this plan can only sustain the provision of four ARNG BCTs for MCO over a period of three years if the mandated four-year dwell time is observed. Based on previous major combat operations, this should be well within the scope of the overall length of the conflict prior to such a time when primary responsibility for the contested region is transferred to IW forces.

Under the “Proposed IW ARFORGEN Model” (Figure 18), the IBCTs and SBCTs of the AC will also follow a three year progression during which they will pass through three phases, each a year in length.




Figure 18. Proposed IW ARFORGEN Model

During “Reset and Phase I Tasks,” IW units of the active component will conduct the following tasks:

- Change of command
- Mandatory block leave
- Permanent Change of Station (PCS) movement
- Equipment maintenance and deep refit (Level 5)
- OES/NCOES professional development
- Local/TRADOC schools (CLS, paramedic, Ranger, AASLT, ABN)
- Civilian education
- Individual soldier skills/small unit collective tasks
- Language training
- Cultural familiarization
- Interpreter operations familiarization

The second year, “Phase II Tasks,” is where units engage in collective training as prescribed by their directed METL. These tasks include:

- Combined live-fire exercises
- Situational training exercises
- External evaluations
- Battalion command-post exercises
- Anticipated area of operations regional study

Similar to their MCO counterparts, units in this phase will culminate in a rotation to one of the Combat Training Centers for battalions and the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) for brigade staffs. However, the focus of these Mission Readiness Exercises (MREs) will be on targeting IW centers of gravity such as the local populace and insurgent networks.

Fully Mission Capable (FMC) units in the third phase are either deployed or eligible for deployment in support of global IW operations. The proposed timeline for AC forces in this cycle is depicted in Figure 19.

As a footnote to this section, it will be necessary for the 82d Airborne Division and the 173 Airborne Brigade to be dual-hatted, with their primary role being that of an IW element, and their secondary role that of the Global Response Force (GRF). Although primarily tasked with IW responsibilities, these unique units possess the only GPF airborne forcible entry capabilities, and therefore, are ideally suited as the GRF. This requirement should not dilute their focus on IW. Rather, it should inform their conduct of airborne operations as tactical exercises focused on the seizure and short-term holding of air heads for follow-on MCO elements.




Figure 19. Proposed AC IW Timeline

For ARNG units in the IW track, there are two separate cycles (Figure 20). The first addresses units which have not been deployed, and are therefore not in need of the mandatory four-year dwell period. These units will follow the same model as the AC, but remain subject to the Homeland Defense contingency in

their second year. ARNG units that have been deployed, however, will follow the six year model as previously outlined for the MCO proponent within the Army National Guard (Figure 17), yet molded for an IW campaign. One BCT will be tasked with providing support for the training of MiTTs at Fort Riley, Kansas, and will therefore be unavailable for four years following this.



Figure 20. Proposed ARNG IW Timeline

Opponents of these cycles will argue that this creates an inability to “surge” forces in support of IW operations, and that there will be limited forces of varying types at the Army’s disposal for MCO. Contrary to this, we argue that HBCTs can “surge” in support of IW operations to perform force protection tasks (i.e., Forward Operating Base security), thus relieving IW elements from this, freeing them to execute the missions for which they are best trained.

Reciprocally, in the case of conventional operations, IW forces can bolster MCO elements during Phase II and Phase III, prior to assuming full responsibility for critical Phase IV operations (Figure 21).




Figure 21. MCO to IW Handoff

D. CONSIDERATIONS

We understand that this transformation will not be without its challenges, specifically in terms of structure, organization, and administration. In an effort to counter some of these, we make the following recommendations:

- Create two separate Programs of Instruction (POIs) for CTCs
- Establish centers of excellence for IW and MCO
- Code positions within the two tracks with IW/MCO identifiers
- Limit PCS options within specific IW or MCO career paths
- Decentralize promotion boards for IW and MCO tracks
- Institute a 36-month unit lifecycle

In order to properly train and certify elements of the IW and MCO tracks, Combat Training Centers will need to be flexible and provide units with scenarios in keeping with their assigned roles. This will require the creation of two separate POIs, one IW-focused and one MCO-focused, in which the respective force type will undergo its training and evaluation. The CTCs will also be tasked with statistically tracking the evidence of skill transferability to account for IW elements' general preparedness in the role of supporting MCO. With this, establish parallel centers of excellence for both IW and MCO at TRADOC to evaluate trends and best practices, and to serve as each force's proponent within the Army's hierarchy to inform OES and NCOES POIs.

U.S. Army Human Resources Command (HRC) will need to establish Army skill identifiers (ASIs) reflecting a soldier's assignment in one track or the other. For example, an Infantry officer, MOS 11A, will henceforth have the MOS of 11A(I0) (I0 identifying those in the IW track), or 11A(M0) (M0 identifying those in the MCO track). The same will apply for all ranks and MOSs. Additionally, soldiers will remain within their specific track throughout their careers. To support this, soldiers will be limited to PCS moves to other units within the same track, saving money to the Army, and minimizing the hardships of relocation to Army families. With the creation of two separate tracks the eventual evolution of two distinct cultures will arise, and consequentially, these two cultures may not necessarily value each other's contribution to global security. Therefore, a modification to the current officer and non-commissioned officer promotion system is prudent. It is our recommendation that two separate boards be created; one for IW presided over by IW officers and NCOs, and likewise one for MCO. This way, the specific skills and positions within each track are not devalued by prejudices or misunderstanding of unfamiliar roles.

Our final recommendation calls for a three-year BCT lifecycle, instituted so that units experience minimal changes in personnel with the exception of losses due to retirements/early terminations of service, or the gain of soldiers to refill these positions. This is not a novel idea, but a recommendation we insist upon to

provide solidarity to our proposal, as well as to remain consistent with the concepts of continuity, familiarity, and predictability for a unit and its soldiers' training and deployment cycles.

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V. THE WAY AHEAD

A. SYNOPSIS

Over the course of this thesis, we have illuminated shortfalls of the current Army force structure and ARFORGEN process in their ability to effectively sustain dissimilar conflicts. The United States has fortunately not been faced with such a challenging predicament; however, this does not justify a continued lack of preparedness due to a hope that multiple threats will not emerge. Having first analyzed the points we believe to be of paramount concern in conducting simultaneous dissimilar operations, we have provided an alternative solution under which the Army can confidently face the likely emergence of dissimilar threats without the need to transition its force *en masse* to either one style of warfare or another.

We have chosen not to alter the BCTs themselves as the foundation of the Army's arsenal, nor have we suggested a radical departure from ARFORGEN as a proficient force management tool. We do, however, believe that in order to rationally prepare for military intervention while facing bi-polar threats, modifications to the current systems must be considered and implemented. We are not so naïve as to assume that this organizational and institutional change will not be met with some form of resistance from advocates of the current system. It is our hope, however, that this thesis will incite some thought on the subject resulting in an honest evaluation of the Army's current capabilities and modifications to its force structure and ARFORGEN process. The final section of this paper is dedicated to subsequent measures that we feel are logical for the implementation of this proposal.

B. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

1. The First Step

We believe the most imperative step in the process of transformation will be the gaining of support from senior Department of Defense and Congressional leaders. In 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act was signed into law in response to both operational and bureaucratic failures within the DoD. In order to avoid repeating these mistakes and to facilitate the implementation of such bold organizational changes, we find it essential as a first step to convince policy and law-makers that deliberate proactive measures are prudent to avoid hasty reactive “patches” derived in a time of crisis.

2. Recommendations for Further Study

- Senior DoD and Congressional Support for Transformation
- Supporting Study of Historical Institutional Transformations

As mentioned above, successfully gaining the support of senior DoD and Congressional leaders is essential if this proposal or proposals similar to this are likely to succeed in transforming the Army. This study can be tied in with lessons from historical institutional transformations in order to determine the optimal strategy for framing the argument and approaching civilian and military leadership.

- BCT Transformation Time Line

Further study is required to explore what timeline is necessary, integrated within the ARFORGEN cycle, in order for AC BCTs to successfully transform from the HBCT to IBCT or SBCT TO&E, and ARNG BCTs to transform from the IBCT or SBCT TO&E to the HBCT TO&E in accordance with this thesis.

- Operational Hindrances Due to the Limited Size of the Army

An entirely separate thesis should study how the Army is limited due to its current size, and what constraints will still be on the Army with its proposed 2013

troop strength. This study could outline, for instance, exactly how many MCO and IW conflicts the Army can engage in, for what lengths of time, and with how many forces (BCTs) dedicated to each.

- Retention and Recruiting Programs

As a supplement to this thesis, an in-depth study of Army retention and recruiting programs to support the proposed transformation is necessary in order to provide U.S. Army Human Resources Command with a product to help facilitate their efforts.

- Fit of IW Force Under Conventional Geographic Combatant Commands vs. Theater Special Operations Commands
- Cultural Comparison of IW vs. MCO and Their Roles Under a Unified Command

With IW forces taking on a historically Special Operations Force-like appearance in the conduct of operations, an exploration of the proper command of these new elements is essential. Questions that may be studied are: 1) Should IW BCTs and conflicts fall under the responsibility of Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC) and TSOC commanders, leaving MCO to the Geographical Combatant Commands and commanders?, and 2) What are the internal U.S. Army cultural impacts of the formation of these two separate elements, and what influence will this likely have on future promotion and selection boards, etc.?

- Skill Transferability Between IW and MCO

A long-term study of skill transferability between IW and MCO must be conducted to determine exactly what skills are not being learned through the conduct of IW, and vice versa. This will allow the Army to tailor POIs within the OES and NCOES systems in order to create an area of general study for soldiers and officers to become familiar with all elements of full spectrum operations while

attending the Basic Non-commissioned Officer Course, the Advanced Non-commissioned Officer Course, the Officer Basic Course, and the Captain's Career Course, to name a few.

- Stabilization, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations

Lastly, Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations (SSTRO) must be addressed as they are essential elements of the comprehensive Joint Operating Concept. A separate study of the requirements of SSTRO is necessary in order to determine the suitability of IW and/or MCO forces in this role, and whether this role will be supported or supporting in conjunction with Special Operations Forces and civilian government agencies.

APPENDIX A: EXAMPLES OF UNI-FOCUSED FAILURE

In other words, great powers often do poorly in small wars simply because they are great powers that must embrace a big-war paradigm by necessity.

-Robert M. Cassidy⁶²

A. CHECHEN WARS (1999)

1. Background

The Chechen capital city of Grozny lies a mere 900 miles to the south of Moscow, yet the two cities are culturally worlds apart. Marked by years of friction, the Russo-Chechen relationship has always been tumultuous, but has further degraded since the demise of the former Soviet Union in 1991. First recognized as a “distinct people” in the seventeenth century, Chechens actively opposed Russian occupation of the Caucasus region during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In 1858, efforts to create an independent Islamic state by Chechen leader Imam Shamil and his fighters were halted by Russian intervention.⁶³ Following the Russian Revolution of 1917, Chechnya again attempted independence, but this too was quelled by the Bolsheviks. In the mid 1930s the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Region (Figure 22)⁶⁴, an area established in 1924 by Russia’s Bolshevik government, “became an autonomous republic.”⁶⁵

⁶² Robert M. Cassidy, *Russia in Afghanistan and Chechnya: Military Strategic Culture and the Paradoxes of Asymmetric Conflict* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, 2003).

⁶³ Anup Shah, “Crisis in Chechnya,” <http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/Chechnya.asp> (accessed May 19, 2008).

⁶⁴ Created by the Bolshevik government following the Chechen declaration of independence in 1917, the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Region encompasses the Chechen and Ingushetia peoples who are predominantly of Sunni Muslim heritage. These regions have vastly different cultural and religious beliefs as stated by Anup Shah in his article “Crisis in Chechnya.”

⁶⁵ Anup Shah, “Crisis in Chechnya,” <http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/Chechnya.asp> (accessed May 19, 2008).



Figure 22. Chechen-Ingush Map⁶⁶

However, due to alleged collaboration with Germans during World War II this union would be short-lived. At the hand of Russian dictator Joseph Stalin, an estimated 400,000-800,000 Chechens were deported to Siberia and Central Asia, of which up to 100,000 reportedly perished from “extreme conditions.”⁶⁷ In 1956, with Nikita Khrushchev’s rise to power, these exiled Chechens were permitted to return and subsequently reestablished the fledgling Chechen-Ingush Republic.⁶⁸ This Republic continued under the auspices of the Soviet Union for more than thirty years until the latter’s failure in 1991, at which time Chechnya, as well as many former Soviet regions, attempted to declare its independence. In 1992, Ingushetia gained independence from Chechnya “and became an autonomous republic within the Russian Federation.” Concurrently, former Soviet Air Force General Dzhokhar Dudayev gained control of Grozny and

⁶⁶ “Chechnya,” *Wikipedia.com*, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chechnya> (accessed May 20, 2008).

⁶⁷ Shah, “Crisis in Chechnya.”

⁶⁸ BBC News, “Regions and Territories: Chechnya,” *BBC.co.uk*, March 12, 2008, http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/2565049.stm (accessed May 15, 2008).

initiated Chechnya's latest campaign for independence.⁶⁹ However, in an attempt to prevent further fracture of the former Soviet states and to maintain control of Chechnya's oil-rich land, Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin dismissed Chechnya's aspiration for independence with the deployment of hundreds of Interior Ministry troops to the region.⁷⁰ Faced with an armed Chechen opposition, the Russians quickly withdrew their forces while tension between Moscow and President Dudayev continued. In 1994, elements of the Russian military invaded Chechnya with the expectation of rapidly destroying any opposition. The once mighty Soviet forces, however, quickly proved to be no match for the guerilla tactics of the Chechen separatists. In 1996, Russian forces ashamedly withdrew from Chechnya, but only after decimating the capitol city of Grozny and leaving 70,000-80,000 dead (mostly civilian casualties) in their wake.⁷¹ Following the withdrawal of Russian forces, a 1996 peace agreement was struck granting Chechnya increased autonomy, but still not its independence. This, coupled with Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov's inability to control newly emerging warlords, and Russia's failure to assist in rebuilding vital infrastructure within Chechnya, led to an August 1999 declaration of holy war on Russia by Chechen fighters and Islamists from the Russian Republic of Dagestan they were supporting. Although this uprising was quickly suppressed, a wave of presumably Chechen bombings within Russia that resulted in hundreds of deaths compelled Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin to once again send military forces to the region. As was true of the 1994 campaign, this latest incursion resulted in a large number of casualties on both sides, and furthered the degradation of vital Chechen infrastructure. Despite a 2003 referendum allowing for an improved constitution that provides Chechnya with greater autonomy, the fighting in Chechnya persists as its people continue to

⁶⁹ Shah, "Crisis in Chechnya."

⁷⁰ BBC News, "Regions and Territories: Chechnya."

⁷¹ Shah, "Crisis in Chechnya."

seek independence from Russian authority. As Henry Kissinger noted in his article *The Vietnam Negotiations*, “The guerilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win.”⁷²

2. Russian Military Forces

The contemporary Russian military reflects a centuries-long evolution from its imperial era through the Soviet period. As Robert Cassidy notes, former “Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Condoleezza Rice’s characterization of the Soviet Military: ‘Reliance on the military power of the state, acquired at great cost and organized like that of military powers of the past, was handed down to the Soviets by historical experience.’”⁷³ Having felt the pains of “attritional wars” in its revolution, official Russian military doctrine formalized its aversion to small conflicts and solidified its orientation on “offensive warfare employing large-scale combined arms formations suitable to the terrain of the central European plateau. Tanks, infantry, and artillery played the principle role.”⁷⁴ Russian doctrine calls for total war, and therefore, “The...Russian armed forces that attacked Grozny were structured and trained for large-scale conventional warfare.”⁷⁵ A 1992 Russian Ministry of Defense draft security document stated “that NATO remained the long-term threat but that regional conflicts and low-intensity warfare were more probable. However, the type of military doctrine and forces required for these two types of conflicts seemed irreconcilable.”⁷⁶

⁷² Henry Kissinger, “The Vietnam Negotiations,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 47, January, 1969: 214.

⁷³ Robert M. Cassidy, *Russia in Afghanistan and Chechnya: Military Strategic Culture and the Paradoxes of Asymmetric Conflict* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, 2003).

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 10.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 11.

⁷⁶ Robert M. Cassidy, *Russia in Afghanistan and Chechnya: Military Strategic Culture and the Paradoxes of Asymmetric Conflict* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, 2003), 12.

3. Analysis

The fledgling Chechen army defeated a Eurasian great power's ostensibly superior army because it was able to use conventional tactics in an unorthodox manner to concentrate against Russian Army weaknesses. This quote highlights the importance of learning from the Russian experience in Chechnya, and incorporating that into U.S. military doctrine, as is reflected in earlier references to the tactics of asymmetric adversaries. The Chechen army, although vastly outnumbered and outgunned, utilized "hit and run" tactics associated with irregular warfare that seeks to incrementally attrite an opponent's military force, frustrate its commanders, and most importantly, weaken the resolve of the government and its constituency. Russian military forces in Chechnya were inflexible and did not adapt for proficiency in irregular warfare. As Cassidy notes, Dudayev's Army was limited in personnel, resources, and training [and] he soon realized that committing his troops to open battle against the Russians would invite disaster. The Russians, however, not understanding the tactics necessary for defeating an insurgency used more force less discriminately in their pursuit of the guerillas.⁷⁷

This is directly tied to "great power" status, and Russia's desire to maintain that in the modern era. Russia chooses to "maintain a central competence in symmetric warfare to preserve their great power status vis-à-vis other great powers," and ignore the need to adapt its military for competency on the irregular battlefield.⁷⁸ As long as Russia continues its paradigm for conventional warfare, success will not be realized vis-à-vis irregular threats, and its counterinsurgency efforts in Chechnya will never conclude in success.

No two historians ever agree on what happened, and the damn thing is they both think they're telling the truth.

-Harry S. Truman⁷⁹

⁷⁷ Robert M. Cassidy, *Russia in Afghanistan and Chechnya: Military Strategic Culture and the Paradoxes of Asymmetric Conflict* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, 2003), 16.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁷⁹ Ami Isseroff, "Israel and Palestine: A Brief History," *Mideastweb.org*, April 7, 2008, <http://www.mideastweb.org/briefhistory.htm> (accessed May 21, 2008).

B. SECOND LEBANON WAR / JULY WAR (2006)

1. Background

Conquered by Hebrew King David in 1000 B.C. and later the Arab armies of Caliph Umar in 638, the rightful claim to Jerusalem has been under contention for the greater portion of recorded history.⁸⁰ Jews and Muslims alike have legitimate religious and historical affiliation to this holy city that continues to serve as the basis for contention in this region today. The Jewish claim has its foundation in the Old Testament where it is written that King David, following the capture of Jerusalem, established the kingdom of the Israelites there. Conversely, Muslims regard Jerusalem as a holy place due to its traditional recognition as the city from which Muhammed ascended into heaven.⁸¹

Following the Arab seizure of Jerusalem in 638, Christians and Jews of Palestine⁸² were permitted to practice their chosen religions, but over time “the local population gradually accepted Islam and the Arab-Islamic culture of their rulers.”⁸³ By the late nineteenth century, approximately six percent of Palestine was occupied by Jews, and due to the imposition of harsh limitations on “immigration and land purchase” by the ruling Ottoman Empire dissention arose and the Zionist movement was formed. In 1897, this movement formalized with the meeting of the first Zionist congress, at which time the goals of establishing a homeland for Jews in Palestine through the voluntary departure of Arabs to Arab

⁸⁰ Ami Isseroff, “Israel and Palestine: A Brief History,” *Mideastweb.org*, April 7, 2008, <http://www.mideastweb.org/briefhistory.htm> (accessed May 21, 2008).

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁸² The name Palestine has its roots in the biblical word *Plesheth*, or as it is called in English, Philistine. “The name Palestine refers to a region of the eastern Mediterranean coast from the sea to the Jordan valley and from the southern Negev desert to the Galilee lake region in the north.” Over time the name changed, but was revived following WWI and the fall of the Ottoman Empire when Great Britain was given mandate over Palestine. Early History Palestine Origin, “Where Did the Name Palestine Come From?,” *PalestineFacts.org*, 2008, http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_early_palestine_name_origin.php (accessed May 29, 2008).

⁸³ Isseroff, “Israel and Palestine: A Brief History.”

lands was set.⁸⁴ This, however, would not happen until the conclusion of World War I when the League of Nations granted portions of the Ottoman Empire to Great Britain as a spoil of war. Eager to keep Palestine from French control, the British requested a mandate to establish the “Jewish national home” there, and following a great deal of Arab opposition to Jewish governance, the American-backed mandate was approved, and the British government was granted “provisional mandate over Palestine.”⁸⁵

By the 1930s, Jewish immigration increased due to persecution in Europe. This immigration became increasingly greater during World War II with the formation of Jewish illegal immigration networks that aided Jews fleeing Nazi persecution. Following WWII, the United Nations Special Commission on Palestine (UNSCOP) recommended the division of Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states.”⁸⁶ Ratified in 1947, this recommendation was welcomed by Jews, but adamantly opposed by Arabs. Israel “proclaimed its independence” in 1948, and through means of war, quickly seized seventy-seven percent of the territory of Palestine forcing more than half of the Palestinian population to flee.⁸⁷ The remaining Palestinian territory was annexed by Egypt and Jordan effectively eliminating the realization of a Palestinian state.

Since Israel’s declaration of independence, numerous wars and small engagements have defined relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Elements of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), comprised of Palestinian exiles living in southern Lebanon, as well as numerous other dissident organizations, have arisen and continually clashed with Israeli Defense

⁸⁴ Isseroff, “Israel and Palestine: A Brief History.”

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ The United Nations, “Question of Palestine,” *UN.org*, <http://www.un.org/depts/dps/ngo/history.html> (accessed May 21, 2008).

⁸⁷ The United Nations, “Question of Palestine.”

Forces (IDF). In 1982, members of one such group, the Abu Nidal⁸⁸ terrorist organization shot and killed Israeli Ambassador Shlomo Argov while in England. In response to this, Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon initiated an invasion of Lebanon. During this, the IDF had its first encounter with elements of the newly formed Shi'ia militant organization Hezbollah (party of Allah), a group formed with the assistance of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).⁸⁹ Adding to the problems in Lebanon, in September, 1982, (pro-Israel) Lebanese President-elect Bashir Gemayel was killed by an alleged Syrian bomb plot that served as the catalyst for Lebanon's descent into anarchy. Israel eventually withdrew the majority of its forces but maintained a highly controversial presence in southern Lebanon until 2000. In 2006, Hezbollah "in a gesture of solidarity with the radical Palestinian organization Hamas," launched rocket attacks on northern Israel while apprehending three IDF soldiers for use in bartering for Hezbollah prisoners held in Israel.⁹⁰ Responding to this, "Israel launched widespread air and artillery strikes on Hezbollah targets in Lebanon and Lebanese infrastructure including Beirut International Airport, vowing to continue the attacks until the Israeli Hostages are returned."⁹¹ Thirty-three days and some ten billion dollars in infrastructure damage later, it is estimated that between seventy and six hundred Hezbollah fighters laid dead, and nine hundred to eleven hundred Lebanese civilians killed, at the cost of over one hundred soldiers and four aircraft to Israel.⁹² Under international pressure, Israel was forced to withdraw from Lebanon in defeat, never able to counter the nearly four thousand rockets fired

⁸⁸ Abu Nidal Organization or Fatah is a Palestinian terrorist organization whose goals are to "derail diplomatic relations between the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the West" Council on Foreign Relations, "Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), aka Fatah Revolutionary Council, the Arab Revolutionary Brigades, or the Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims," *CFR.org*, February 22, 2008, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/9153/> (accessed May 22, 2008).

⁸⁹ Kathryn Westcott, "Who Are Hezbollah?," BBC News, April 4, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1908671.stm (accessed May 29, 2008).

⁹⁰ Alfred B. Prados, "Lebanon," CRS Report for Congress, FAS.org, September 4, 2007, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33509.pdf> (accessed May 27, 2008).

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Alfred Prados, "Lebanon."

across its borders at the hands of the Arabs, and with its image of strength under question within the world community.⁹³ Conversely, Hezbollah under Secretary General Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah succeeded in its goal of seeking “to take actions to prove its strength and dominance.”⁹⁴

2. Israeli Defense Forces

*On May 15, 1948, the day the British Mandate over Palestine ended, the armies of five neighboring Arab states invaded the new State of Israel, which had declared its independence the previous day.*⁹⁵

Vastly outnumbered and lacking the tools of war, the Haganah,⁹⁶ the Irgun Zeva'i Le'ummi, and the Lohamei Herut (all separate elements of existing Jewish defense forces) combined and “agreed to cease their independent activities” in an effort to fuse their capabilities. On May 28, 1948, Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion signed Israel Ordinance No. 4 effectively establishing the existing land, navy, and air forces as the Israeli Defense Forces⁹⁷ Due to the crisis condition of the time, mandatory conscription was enacted as the entire Israeli society mobilized for the survival of their new state. Israel succeeded in defending its independence, and through modernization evolved into a competent military. Today, Israel's military is the most powerful in the region, and the willingness of its people to mobilize in support of Israel's survival persists.

93 Anthony H. Cordesman and Arleigh A. Burke, “The Lessons of the Israeli-Lebanon War,” Center for Strategic and International Studies: 3, March 11, 2008, <http://www.csis.org/burke/reports> (accessed May 23, 2008).

94 Yosef Kuperwasser, speech on Engaging the Enemy: Lessons Learned from the Israeli-Hezbollah War, (The Saban Center Policy Luncheon, November 2, 2006), The Brookings Institute, <http://www.brookings.edu/events/2006/1102middle-east.aspx?p=1> (accessed May 21, 2008).

95 Joel Leyden, “Israeli Defense Forces: A Proud History,” Israel News Agency, <http://www.israelnewsagency.com/isrealdefenseforces120374.html> (accessed May 21, 2008).

96 The independent underground military force of Israel formed in 1920. The Haganah formalized in 1929 due to Arab riots, and conducted missions with British units during WWII. At the direction of Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, the Haganah transformed into the Israeli Defense Forces on May 26, 1948. The American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise, “The Haganah,” <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/haganah.html> (accessed May 27, 2008).

97 Joel Leyden, “Israeli Defense Forces.”

As implied in its name, Israel's military is a defensive force with the mission of protecting "the existence and territorial sovereignty of the state of Israel [through] a strong deterrent capacity to dissuade potential enemies from attacking."⁹⁸ However, because of its limited land mass, Israeli doctrine states that "...Israel must prevent the enemy from entering its territory, and must quickly transfer the battle to enemy territory."⁹⁹ Due to its relatively small population, Israel has encountered difficulty maintaining a sizeable standing military, and therefore "relies heavily on its reserve forces...in time of war."¹⁰⁰

Although Israel achieved decisive victories in conventional wars between 1948 and 1973, and has had a great deal of success using its special missions units (the Sayaret and Unit 101) in combating terrorist, Hezbollah remains a figurative thorn in Israel's side due to the fact that conflicts with Hezbollah have historically resulted in Israel's defeat or capitulation to UN mandates.¹⁰¹ This was highlighted most recently in 2006 with Israel's embarrassing defeat at the hands of Hezbollah which led to harsh criticism of "Israel's senior war-time leaders," and the exposure of numerous flaws within the IDF."¹⁰²

3. Analysis

Israel's war with Hezbollah fighters in Lebanon during the summer of 2006 revealed multiple weaknesses within the IDF. The first of these was Israel's inability to effectively communicate accurate battle damage assessments between its air and ground forces. As stated by Alastair Crooke and Mark Perry in their article, *How Hezbollah Defeated Israel*, While Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) units had been making forays into southern Lebanon during the second week of the conflict, the Israeli military leadership remained undecided over when

⁹⁸ Joel Leyden, "Israeli Defense Forces."

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Eric Westervelt, "Israeli Report Criticizes Olmert for Lebanon Action", *NPR.org*, May 29 2008, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=9924495> (accessed May 29, 2008).

and where – even whether – to deploy their ground units.” This indecisiveness was due “In part” to the Israeli Air Force’s (IAF) claims that strategic goals were being met through air power, and that “just one more day” was required to achieve success; this apparently was not the case.¹⁰³ On July 22, the U.S. began shipments of precision weapons to Israel, and indication to Pentagon officials “...that Israel had expended most of its munitions in the wars first 10 days...”¹⁰⁴ The reporting of the IAF drastically conflicted with IDF units already positioned in southern Lebanon who reported “Hezbollah units were fighting tenaciously to hold their positions.”¹⁰⁵ In response to this, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert decided to “deploy the full might of the IDF to defeat Hezbollah” and initiated the call-up of the reserves for the purpose of “buttress[ing] forces already fighting in southern Lebanon, and to add weight to the ground assault.”¹⁰⁶

This call-up of reserve forces led to a second issue, that is, Israel’s inability to provide them with the necessary “food, ammunition and even water [that] reached units a full 24-48 hours behind a unit’s appearance in its assigned northern deployment zones.”¹⁰⁷ Israel’s focus on a “qualitative lead” to compensate for its “quantitative disadvantage” had apparently created a logistical gap that only became apparent in this time of quantitative necessity.¹⁰⁸ These two issues were further frustrated by the strategy of Brigadier General Ido Nehushtan, a member of Israel’s general staff, who stated that the IDF must concentrate on the need to “disrupt the military logic” of Hezbollah.¹⁰⁹ This

¹⁰³ Alastair Crooke and Mark Perry, “How Hezbollah Defeated Israel Part 2: Winning the Ground War,” *Asia Times*, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HJ12Ak01.html (accessed May 21, 2008).

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Crooke and Perry, “How Hezbollah Defeated Israel.”

¹⁰⁸ Joel Leyden, “Israeli Defense Forces.”

¹⁰⁹ Crooke and Perry, “How Hezbollah Defeated Israel.”

ambiguous tactic of “disrupting the military logic” caused a great deal of confusion among ground commanders of the IDF who were left “wonder[ing] exactly what the war’s goals were.”¹¹⁰

In the end, Hezbollah executed its defense using only three thousand troops of the Nasr Brigade versus the entire might of the IDF. “Hezbollah commanders found Israeli troops were poorly organized and disciplined,” and never indicated any intention of activating reserves of their own.¹¹¹ IDF commanders too had a poor assessment of their troop’s performance “noting a signal lack of discipline even among [their] best-trained regular soldiers. The reserves were worse, and IDF commanders hesitated to put them into battle.”¹¹²

The IDF has spent the majority of its existence dealing with the police-like actions closely associated with counterinsurgency against Hamas, Hezbollah and the PLO. This focus on irregular warfare, although necessary to a degree, has left their military decrepit and questioning its ability to conduct major combat operations. As one Hezbollah commander stated following the July War, “The IDF was ‘a motley assortment...But that’s what happens when you have spent four decades firing rubber bullets at women and children in the West Bank and Gaza’.”¹¹³

The U.S. should note this as a warning against focusing its military strength on one niche of conflict, and appreciate the need for a balanced force capable of irregular as well as conventional operations. Continued focus on counterinsurgency on the part of the IDF has the potential to leave Israel vulnerable to its Arab neighbors and in a weakened state of preparedness, where the need for U.S. intervention or the use of strategic weapons may be the only option for its survival.

¹¹⁰ Crooke and Perry, “How Hezbollah Defeated Israel.”

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Ibid.

The U.S. Army can learn many valuable lessons from both the Russian experience in Chechnya as well as Israel's recent debacle in Lebanon. It is our belief that the most important of these is the recognition of the need for, and the development of the ability to understand the enemy. The U.S. Army should not focus its efforts on the style of warfare it is most comfortable and familiar with; it should tailor elements of the force to symmetrically cope with what it categorizes as asymmetric threats. It is only when the Army is capable of meeting all threats symmetrically that it will be fully prepared to execute operations globally in a succinct, coherent manner. It is in this that the Russian and Israeli armies have failed in their recent exploits, as alluded to earlier in the body of this thesis (Chapter IV, "Game Theory"), and why the U.S. Army has had such a difficult time fighting an insurgency following the fall of Baghdad in 2003. These examples are directly tied to this thesis in the respect that our recommendations provide a remedy to these problems of asymmetry through the prescription that a portion of the Army be dedicated to dealing with irregular threats, while the remainder is reserved as a respondent and deterrent for major combat operations. In this, the Army will view no enemy as asymmetric because it will have units trained, equipped, and capable of symmetrical employment vis-à-vis conventional and irregular threats alike.

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INFANTRY BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM (IBCT)	COL	LTC	MAJ	CPT	1LT	W4	W3	W2	CMS/SGM	1SG/MSG	SFC	SSG	SGT	CP/SPC	PRC
ANNUAL ACTIVE DUTY PAY:	\$189,769.93	\$119,489.52	\$103,814.12	\$87,282.52	\$72,422.32	\$91,307.52	\$76,871.52	\$69,742.32	\$65,314.58	\$75,445.58	\$69,122.78	\$64,382.38	\$57,189.98	\$62,707.98	\$49,573.98
ANNUAL DRILL PAY:	\$18,279.30	\$12,549.33	\$10,979.74	\$10,016.58	\$7,088.19	\$10,604.94	\$8,807.24	\$7,186.51	\$9,507.59	\$7,964.03	\$8,986.68	\$8,277.30	\$5,098.79	\$4,820.39	\$4,107.02
ANNUAL DIFFERENCE PER 1 OF EACH RANK:	\$121,472.62	\$104,499.78	\$91,271.79	\$77,275.76	\$65,106.17	\$80,702.88	\$68,644.28	\$62,555.81	\$75,807.02	\$67,481.54	\$62,186.11	\$58,114.87	\$52,089.24	\$48,087.59	\$45,468.98
IBCT	2	9	34	106	131	2	4	24	12	45	189	345	614	1117	682
TOTAL ANNUAL COST BY RANK PER 1 BCT (ACTIVE)	\$719,507.84	\$1,074,919.88	\$3,829,714.08	\$9,252,985.92	\$9,450,649.92	\$182,615.04	\$307,488.08	\$1,673,815.68	\$1,023,772.32	\$3,395,050.20	\$10,921,398.08	\$22,194,684.20	\$35,096,216.44	\$58,874,791.32	\$42,288,711.92
TOTAL ANNUAL COST BY RANK PER 1 BCT (DRILL)	\$36,559.60	\$194,781.68	\$426,479.22	\$1,061,795.96	\$921,735.66	\$21,209.88	\$33,228.96	\$172,476.24	\$114,088.14	\$98,931.13	\$1,100,731.49	\$2,445,005.78	\$3,129,889.16	\$5,160,970.06	\$3,499,296.42
ANNUAL COST DIFFERENCE BY RANK	\$242,949.24	\$880,138.02	\$3,103,240.86	\$8,191,230.56	\$8,528,914.26	\$161,405.16	\$274,257.12	\$1,501,339.44	\$909,684.18	\$3,296,069.08	\$9,820,666.58	\$20,049,678.42	\$31,966,326.28	\$53,713,821.28	\$38,789,415.50
SAVINGS BY REMOVING 2 BCT'S FROM ROTATION BY RANK	\$465,899.48	\$1,880,276.04	\$6,206,481.72	\$16,382,461.12	\$17,057,816.54	\$322,810.32	\$548,514.74	\$3,000,678.88	\$1,815,388.36	\$6,073,338.15	\$19,641,329.18	\$40,099,256.85	\$63,983,652.58	\$107,427,642.55	\$77,478,968.00
TOTAL ANNUAL BCT COST (ACTIVE):	\$199,458,295.72	\$199,458,295.72	\$199,458,295.72	\$199,458,295.72	\$199,458,295.72	\$199,458,295.72	\$199,458,295.72	\$199,458,295.72	\$199,458,295.72	\$199,458,295.72	\$199,458,295.72	\$199,458,295.72	\$199,458,295.72	\$199,458,295.72	\$199,458,295.72
TOTAL ANNUAL BCT COST (DRILL):	\$18,316,051.72	\$18,316,051.72	\$18,316,051.72	\$18,316,051.72	\$18,316,051.72	\$18,316,051.72	\$18,316,051.72	\$18,316,051.72	\$18,316,051.72	\$18,316,051.72	\$18,316,051.72	\$18,316,051.72	\$18,316,051.72	\$18,316,051.72	\$18,316,051.72
TOTAL ANNUAL SAVINGS PER BCT:	\$181,140,244.01	\$181,140,244.01	\$181,140,244.01	\$181,140,244.01	\$181,140,244.01	\$181,140,244.01	\$181,140,244.01	\$181,140,244.01	\$181,140,244.01	\$181,140,244.01	\$181,140,244.01	\$181,140,244.01	\$181,140,244.01	\$181,140,244.01	\$181,140,244.01
TOTAL ANNUAL SAVINGS BY REMOVING 2 BCT'S FROM ROTATION:	\$362,280,488.01	\$362,280,488.01	\$362,280,488.01	\$362,280,488.01	\$362,280,488.01	\$362,280,488.01	\$362,280,488.01	\$362,280,488.01	\$362,280,488.01	\$362,280,488.01	\$362,280,488.01	\$362,280,488.01	\$362,280,488.01	\$362,280,488.01	\$362,280,488.01
COST PER STRIKER VEHICLE:	\$1,420,000.00	\$1,420,000.00	\$1,420,000.00	\$1,420,000.00	\$1,420,000.00	\$1,420,000.00	\$1,420,000.00	\$1,420,000.00	\$1,420,000.00	\$1,420,000.00	\$1,420,000.00	\$1,420,000.00	\$1,420,000.00	\$1,420,000.00	\$1,420,000.00
TOTAL STRIKERS PER BCT:	317	317	317	317	317	317	317	317	317	317	317	317	317	317	317
COST OF STRIKERS PER BCT:	\$450,140,000.00	\$450,140,000.00	\$450,140,000.00	\$450,140,000.00	\$450,140,000.00	\$450,140,000.00	\$450,140,000.00	\$450,140,000.00	\$450,140,000.00	\$450,140,000.00	\$450,140,000.00	\$450,140,000.00	\$450,140,000.00	\$450,140,000.00	\$450,140,000.00
OR															
COST OF FIELDING 1 BCT'S STRIKERS OFFSET BY THE REMOVAL OF 2 ARNG BCT'S FROM COMBAT ROTATIONS:	\$87,779,511.99	\$87,779,511.99	\$87,779,511.99	\$87,779,511.99	\$87,779,511.99	\$87,779,511.99	\$87,779,511.99	\$87,779,511.99	\$87,779,511.99	\$87,779,511.99	\$87,779,511.99	\$87,779,511.99	\$87,779,511.99	\$87,779,511.99	\$87,779,511.99
COST PER MRAP:	\$500,000.00	\$500,000.00	\$500,000.00	\$500,000.00	\$500,000.00	\$500,000.00	\$500,000.00	\$500,000.00	\$500,000.00	\$500,000.00	\$500,000.00	\$500,000.00	\$500,000.00	\$500,000.00	\$500,000.00
TOTAL MRAP'S PER BCT:	317	317	317	317	317	317	317	317	317	317	317	317	317	317	317
COST OF MRAP'S PER BCT:	\$158,500,000.00	\$158,500,000.00	\$158,500,000.00	\$158,500,000.00	\$158,500,000.00	\$158,500,000.00	\$158,500,000.00	\$158,500,000.00	\$158,500,000.00	\$158,500,000.00	\$158,500,000.00	\$158,500,000.00	\$158,500,000.00	\$158,500,000.00	\$158,500,000.00
COST OF FIELDING 1 BCT'S MRAP'S OFFSET BY THE REMOVAL OF 2 ARNG BCT'S FROM COMBAT ROTATIONS:	-\$203,860,488.01	-\$203,860,488.01	-\$203,860,488.01	-\$203,860,488.01	-\$203,860,488.01	-\$203,860,488.01	-\$203,860,488.01	-\$203,860,488.01	-\$203,860,488.01	-\$203,860,488.01	-\$203,860,488.01	-\$203,860,488.01	-\$203,860,488.01	-\$203,860,488.01	-\$203,860,488.01

Number of soldiers by rank per BCT come from Office of Infantry, Proponentry, Fort Benning, GA and reflect changes to authorized strength for 2019 (as of July 2009)

Striker vehicle cost is 1.42 million dollars. Source of Striker vehicle cost was obtained from: http://www.dps.gov/new_research/9671.pdf United States General Accounting Office Report to Congressional Committees, May 2009

**Number of Striker vehicles per SECT obtained from: <http://dodcas.org/DODCAS2009presentation/DODCAS2009Presentation.pdf> (Slide #3)

***MRAP cost is estimated to be \$500,000 based on information obtained from: <http://www.usatoday.com/The Truck the Pentagon Wants and the Firm That Makes It>

****Number of MRAP is an assumption that units will require a similar number of MRAPs as Strikers and is for illustrative purposes only.

Figure 24. Vehicle Procurement Cost Savings

APPENDIX C: BCT MOS COMPARISON

COMPARISON OF BCT MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES BY RANK																	
LEGEND																	
NO DIFFERENCE IN PERSONNEL ASSIGNED FROM THE BCT TOE																	
EXCESS PERSONNEL FROM THE BCT TOE NOT REQUIRED FOR THE SBCT OR IBCT																	
DEFICIT FROM THE BCT TOE - PERSONNEL REQUIRED IN ORDER TO FULFILL SBCT/IBCT MANNING																	
MOS		PAY GRADES															
		O6	O5	O4	O3	O2	W5	W4	W3	W2	W1	E9	E8	E7	E6	E5	E4/E3
00D	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	5	3
	HBCT													2	4	2	
	SBCT													2	4	0	2
00Z	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT											7					
	SBCT											7					
01A	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT		1	4	5												
	SBCT		1	4	7												
02A	IBCT	0	1	4	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT			1													
	SBCT			1	1												
02B	IBCT	0	4	4	6	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT		4	4	6	6											
	SBCT		4														
02C	IBCT	0	0	4	6	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	SBCT	1	1														
03A	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT				3	1											
	SBCT																
05A	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT			1													
	SBCT			1													
11A	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT	2	5	6	20	46											
	SBCT			7	28	52											
11B	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT	2	5	6	20	46											
	SBCT			7	28	52											
11C	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT	2	5	6	20	46											
	SBCT			7	28	52											
11Z	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT	2	5	6	20	46											
	SBCT			7	28	52											

MOS		O6	O5	O4	O3	O2	W5	W4	W3	W2	W1	E9	E8	E7	E6	E5	E4/E3
131A		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT							1	1	1							
	HBCT							1	1	3							
	SBCT							2	2								
13A		0	0	0	0	0	0	1	-1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT				2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT				2	3	13	23									
	SBCT				1	3	14	32									
13B		0	1	0	3	-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT														9	20	36
	HBCT														9	20	36
	SBCT														94	18	36
13D		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	9	-14
	IBCT														1	5	5
	HBCT														1	5	42
	SBCT														1	7	55
13F		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	-13
	IBCT														9	13	35
	HBCT														9	13	20
	SBCT														9	15	32
13R		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	5
	IBCT														1	1	1
	HBCT														1	2	3
	SBCT														1	2	3
13S		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
	IBCT														1	2	4
	HBCT														1	2	4
	SBCT														2	2	2
13W		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
	IBCT														1	1	1
	HBCT														1	1	1
	SBCT														1	1	1
13Z		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT														6		
	HBCT														6		
	SBCT														6		
140A		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT								1								
	HBCT								1								
	SBCT								1								
14A		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT																
	HBCT																
	SBCT				1												
14B		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT				1	1											
	HBCT				1	1											
	SBCT				1	1											
14J		0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT														2	1	
	HBCT														2	1	
	SBCT														1	1	
14S		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
	IBCT																
	HBCT																
	SBCT																

MOS		O6	O5	O4	O3	O2	W5	W4	W3	W2	W1	E9	E8	E7	E6	E5	E4/E3
14Z	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT																
	SBCT																
		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
150U	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT									1							
	SBCT									1							
		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
152D	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT								1								
	SBCT								1								
		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
152H	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT								1								
	SBCT								1								
		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
15B	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT			1	1												
	SBCT			1	1												1
		0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
15J	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT																2
	SBCT																1
		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
15P	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT												1	1	1	1	
	SBCT												1	1	1	1	
		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1
15Q	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT																
	SBCT																
		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
15W	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT												1	1	3	8	
	SBCT												1	1	3	8	
		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
19A	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT			1	1												
	SBCT			1	1												
		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
19B	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT				4	16											
	SBCT				4	16											
		0	0	0	4	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
19C	IBCT	0	1	1	4	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT			1	3	9											
	SBCT			1	3	9											
		0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
19D	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT												8	16	28	71	
	SBCT												8	16	28	71	
		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
19K	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT												18	29	64	127	
	SBCT												18	29	64	127	
		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

MOS		O6	O5	O4	O3	O2	W5	W4	W3	W2	W1	E9	E8	E7	E6	E5	E4/E3	
19Z		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	8	0	0	0	0	
	IBCT											1	3					
	HBCT											2	11					
	SBCT										1	4						
215D		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	7	0	0	0	0	
	IBCT										1	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	HBCT										1							
	SBCT																	
21A		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	IBCT			1	1													
	HBCT			1	1													
	SBCT																	
21B		0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	IBCT			1	1	2								4	9	14	51	
	HBCT			1	4	6								7	13	26	88	
	SBCT			1	2	5							4	9	31	58		
21C		0	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	9	15	30	
	IBCT																	
	HBCT																	
	SBCT																	
21E		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	4
	IBCT																	
	HBCT																	
	SBCT																	
21H		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	4
	IBCT																	
	HBCT																	
	SBCT																	
21J		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	4
	IBCT																	
	HBCT																	
	SBCT																	
21N		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	4
	IBCT																	
	HBCT																	
	SBCT																	
21Y		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2
	IBCT																	
	HBCT																	
	SBCT																	
21Z		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT																	
	HBCT																	
	SBCT																	
250N		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT										1							
	HBCT										1							
	SBCT									1								
251A		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT										1							
	HBCT										1							
	SBCT									1								
254A		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT										1							
	HBCT										1							
	SBCT									1								

MOS		O6	O5	O4	O3	O2	W5	W4	W3	W2	W1	E9	E8	E7	E6	E5	E4/E3
25A		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT			1	6	3											
	HBCT			1	6	3											
	SBCT			1	7	3											
25B		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT													1	2	2	3
	HBCT													2	3	7	14
	SBCT													2	3	9	14
25C		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT														2	1	5
	HBCT														2	2	6
	SBCT														2	2	6
25D		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT													1	1		
	HBCT																
	SBCT																
25E		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT																
	HBCT																
	SBCT														1		
25F		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT														4	1	1
	HBCT														4	2	4
	SBCT														4	3	3
25L		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT														4	3	3
	HBCT														1	3	3
	SBCT														1	3	3
25N		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT																
	HBCT																
	SBCT														1	2	5
25Q		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT															8	10
	HBCT															8	10
	SBCT															9	13
25S		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT														1	2	4
	HBCT														1	2	4
	SBCT														1	2	4
25U		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT														3	5	4
	HBCT														2	6	29
	SBCT														3	5	7
25W		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT														3		
	HBCT														3		
	SBCT														2		
27A		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT				1	1											
	HBCT				1	1											
	SBCT				1												
27D		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT														1	3	3
	HBCT														1	3	3
	SBCT														1	4	2

MOS		O6	O5	O4	O3	O2	W5	W4	W3	W2	W1	E9	E8	E7	E6	E5	E4/E3
30A		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT			1													
	HBCT			1													
	SBCT			1	1												
31A		0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT					1	1										
	HBCT					1	1										
	SBCT			1													
31B		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT					0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT													2	3	9	28
	SBCT													2	3	9	28
31E		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT																
	HBCT																
	SBCT													1			
33W		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT																
	HBCT																
	SBCT																
350F		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT									1							
	HBCT									1							
	SBCT									4							
351L		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT									1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT									1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	SBCT									2							
351M		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT									1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT									1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	SBCT									2							
353T		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT									1							
	HBCT									1							
	SBCT									1							
35D		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT			1	7	8											
	HBCT			1	7	8											
	SBCT			1	10	9											
35E		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT					1											
	HBCT					1											
	SBCT					1											
35F		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT									1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT									1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	SBCT			1						6	8	13	38				
35G		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT					1											
	HBCT					1											
	SBCT					1											
35H		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT														1	1	4
	HBCT														1	1	4
	SBCT														1	1	4

MOS		O6	O5	O4	O3	O2	W5	W4	W3	W2	W1	E9	E8	E7	E6	E5	E4/E3
35L	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
	HBCT													1			
	SBCT															6	
35M	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
	HBCT														4	4	8
	SBCT												1	1	13	14	23
35N	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
	HBCT															2	2
	SBCT														1	2	3
35P	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
	HBCT													1	1	2	5
	SBCT													1	1	3	7
35T	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2
	HBCT														1	2	4
	SBCT															1	4
35Z	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
	HBCT													1			
	SBCT													1			
37F	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT														1		
	SBCT														1		
38A	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT			1													
	SBCT			1													
38B	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT														1		
	SBCT																
420A	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT										1						
	SBCT										1						
42A	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT													1	6	8	14
	SBCT													1	6	8	13
42B	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT				5	2											
	SBCT				5	2											
42F	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT				6	1											
	SBCT				6	1											
42H	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT															1	1
	SBCT															1	1

MOS		O6	O5	O4	O3	O2	W5	W4	W3	W2	W1	E9	E8	E7	E6	E5	E4/E3
42L	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
	HBCT																
	SBCT																
44B	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
	HBCT															5	6
	SBCT															5	7
45B	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT															2	6
	SBCT															6	
45G	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT															1	10
	SBCT															1	10
45K	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT															2	6
	SBCT															6	
46A	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT															1	1
	SBCT															1	1
46Q	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT															1	1
	SBCT															1	1
46R	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT															1	1
	SBCT															1	1
51C	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT															0	0
	SBCT															0	0
52C	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT															1	4
	SBCT															1	6
52D	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT															1	3
	SBCT															5	7
53A	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT															1	8
	SBCT															1	12
56A	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT															1	6
	SBCT															1	6
56M	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT															1	4
	SBCT															1	4

MOS		O6	O5	O4	O3	O2	W5	W4	W3	W2	W1	E9	E8	E7	E6	E5	E4/E3	
57A		0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	IBCT				1													
	HBCT				1													
	SBCT				1													
62B		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	IBCT			1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	4	
	HBCT			2	1											2	3	
	SBCT			1	1											1	4	
63A		0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	6	16	24
	IBCT				1										4	6	16	24
	HBCT				1										4	6	16	24
	SBCT				1										4	6	16	24
63B		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	6	16	24
	IBCT														4	6	16	24
	HBCT														4	6	16	24
	SBCT														4	6	16	24
63D		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	6	16	24
	IBCT														4	6	16	24
	HBCT														4	6	16	24
	SBCT														4	6	16	24
63H		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	6	16	24
	IBCT														4	6	16	24
	HBCT														4	6	16	24
	SBCT														4	6	16	24
63J		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	6	16	24
	IBCT														4	6	16	24
	HBCT														4	6	16	24
	SBCT														4	6	16	24
63M		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	6	16	24
	IBCT														4	6	16	24
	HBCT														4	6	16	24
	SBCT														4	6	16	24
63X		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	6	16	24
	IBCT														4	6	16	24
	HBCT														4	6	16	24
	SBCT														4	6	16	24
63Z		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	6	16	24
	IBCT														4	6	16	24
	HBCT														4	6	16	24
	SBCT														4	6	16	24
65B		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	6	16	24
	IBCT														4	6	16	24
	HBCT														4	6	16	24
	SBCT														4	6	16	24
65D		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	6	16	24
	IBCT														4	6	16	24
	HBCT														4	6	16	24
	SBCT														4	6	16	24
66H		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	6	16	24
	IBCT														4	6	16	24
	HBCT														4	6	16	24
	SBCT														4	6	16	24
67D		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	6	16	24
	IBCT														4	6	16	24
	HBCT														4	6	16	24
	SBCT														4	6	16	24

MOS		O6	O5	O4	O3	O2	W5	W4	W3	W2	W1	E9	E8	E7	E6	E5	E4/E3
68A		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT																1
	HBCT																1
	SBCT																1
68E		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	-1
	IBCT																1
	HBCT																1
	SBCT																1
68G		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT																1
	HBCT																1
	SBCT																1
68J		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
	IBCT															1	2
	HBCT															2	1
	SBCT															1	2
68K		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT																1
	HBCT																1
	SBCT																1
68P		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT																1
	HBCT																1
	SBCT																1
68Q		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT																1
	HBCT																1
	SBCT																1
68S		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT																1
	HBCT																1
	SBCT																1
68W		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT														1	9	6
	HBCT														1	9	15
	SBCT														1	10	10
68X		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT																1
	HBCT																1
	SBCT																1
70B		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT					1	6										
	HBCT					1	6										
	SBCT					1	7										
70H		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT					2											
	HBCT					1											
	SBCT					2											
70K		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT					1	1										
	HBCT					1	1										
	SBCT					1											
72D		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT					1											
	HBCT					1											
	SBCT					1											

MOS		O6	O5	O4	O3	O2	W5	W4	W3	W2	W1	E9	E8	E7	E6	E5	E4/E3
74A		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT					1											
	HBCT					1											
	SBCT					1											
74B		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT				-1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT				2	3											
	SBCT				1	4											
74D		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT													3	7	17	19
	HBCT												3	6	20	18	
	SBCT												2	8	22	12	
882A		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT									1							
	HBCT									1							
	SBCT									1							
88A		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT				1	6											
	HBCT				1	5											
	SBCT				1	1											
88M		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT														6	21	41
	HBCT													2	20	24	173
	SBCT													1	8	12	21
88N		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT													1	2	1	
	HBCT													1	1	1	
	SBCT													1	1	1	
890A		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT									1							
	HBCT									1							
	SBCT									1							
89A		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT																
	HBCT																
	SBCT															1	1
89B		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT													1	2	2	8
	HBCT													1	2	2	8
	SBCT													1	2	1	7
90A		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT			1	4	10											
	HBCT			1	4	10											
	SBCT			1	4	6											
913A		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT																
	HBCT									1							
	SBCT									1							
914A		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT																
	HBCT																
	SBCT																
915A		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT																
	HBCT																
	SBCT																

MOS		O6	O5	O4	O3	O2	W5	W4	W3	W2	W1	E9	E8	E7	E6	E5	E4/E3
915E		0	0	0	0	0	0	-1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT							1	1								
	HBCT								1	1							
	SBCT							1	6								
919A		0	0	0	0	0	0	-1	-3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT								1								
	HBCT								1								
	SBCT								1								
91A		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT					4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT					2	7										
	SBCT					2	11										
920A		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT									1							
	HBCT									1							
	SBCT									1							
920B		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT									1							
	HBCT									1							
	SBCT									1							
922A		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT									2							
	HBCT									2							
	SBCT									1							
92A		0	0	0	0	-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	9	13
	IBCT					2	9						3	6	4	13	42
	HBCT					2	8						4	6	6	13	55
	SBCT					1	3						4	1	3	7	39
92F		0	0	0	0	1	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	3	6	16
	IBCT													-1	-1	25	56
	HBCT													1	7	16	34
	SBCT													1	6	41	90
92G		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	5	31	72
	IBCT													2	2	-1	
	HBCT													1	6	8	18
	SBCT													1	6	10	20
92L		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	10	21	60
	IBCT															1	
	HBCT															1	
	SBCT															1	
92M		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT															1	
	HBCT															1	
	SBCT															1	
92W		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT														1	0	4
	HBCT														1	1	6
	SBCT														1	3	5
92Y		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	14
	IBCT													-1	-1	-3	6
	HBCT													2	7	22	49
	SBCT													1	6	19	24
948B		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	7	18	42
	IBCT															1	4
	HBCT															1	7
	SBCT															1	4
915E		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT									1							
	HBCT									1							
	SBCT									1							

MOS		O6	O5	O4	O3	O2	W5	W4	W3	W2	W1	E9	E8	E7	E6	E5	E4/E3
948D	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT									1							
	SBCT																
94A	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT														1	2	3
	SBCT														1	1	4
94E	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	-1
	HBCT																2
	SBCT																3
94F	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT															4	5
	SBCT															4	8
94M	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3
	HBCT															1	5
	SBCT																4
94W	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
	HBCT																
	SBCT																
96B	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT																
	SBCT																
96D	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT																
	SBCT																
96H	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT																
	SBCT																
96U	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT																
	SBCT																
97B	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT																
	SBCT																
97E	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT																
	SBCT																
98C	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT																
	SBCT																
98G	IBCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HBCT																
	SBCT																

MCS		O6	O5	O4	O3	O2	W5	W4	W3	W2	W1	E9	E8	E7	E6	E5	E4/E3
98Z		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	IBCT												1				
	HBCT																
	SBCT																

APPENDIX D: DEFINITIONS AND TERMS

General Purpose Forces

IW JOC: The regular armed forces of a country, other than nuclear forces and special operations forces, that are organized, trained, and equipped to perform a broad range of missions across the range of military operations. Also called GPF. (Proposed)

Irregular

IW JOC: Activities, operations, organizations, capabilities, etc., in which significant numbers of combatants engage in insurgency and other nonconventional military and paramilitary operations without being members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces of any country. See also conventional, nonconventional. (Proposed)

Irregular Forces

JP 1-02: Armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces.

Irregular Warfare

IW JOC: A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will. Also called IW. (Proposed)

Major Operation

JP 1-02: A series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by combat forces of a single or several Services, coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an operational area. These actions are conducted simultaneously or sequentially in accordance with a

common plan and are controlled by a single commander. For noncombat operations, a reference to the relative size and scope of a military operation.

Nonconventional

IW JOC: Activities, operations, organizations, capabilities, etc., for which the regular armed forces of a country, excluding designated special operations forces, do not have a broad-based requirement for the conduct of combat operations against the regular armed forces of another country. This term included the employment of conventional forces and capabilities in nonstandard ways for nonstandard purposes. (Proposed)

Operational Environment

JP 3-0: A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decision of the commander.

Reconstruction

SSTRO JOC: The process of rebuilding degraded, damaged, or destroyed political, socio-economic, and physical infrastructure of a country or territory to create the foundation for longer-term development.

Security

SSTRO JOC: The establishment of a safe and secure environment for the local populace, host nation military and civilian organizations as well as USG and coalition agencies, which are conducting SSTR operations.

Stability Operations

JP 1-02: An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instrument of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure, reconstruction and humanitarian relief.

Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations

Authors: Highly integrated military, civilian, interagency and international operations conducted across the continuum from peace to crisis and conflict in order to assist a state or region that is under severe stress or has collapsed due to either a natural or man-made disaster.¹¹⁴

Stabilization

SSTRO JOC: Activities undertaken to manage underlying tensions, to prevent or halt the deterioration of security, economic, and/or political systems, to create stability in the host nation or region, and to establish the preconditions for reconstruction efforts.

Transition

SSTRO JOC: The process of shifting the lead responsibility and authority for helping provide of foster security, essential services, humanitarian assistance, economic development, and political governance from the intervening military and civilian agencies to the host nation. Transitions are event driven and will occur within the major mission elements (MMEs) at the point when the entity assuming the lead responsibility has the capability and capacity to carry out the relevant activities.

¹¹⁴ Author's proposed definition using elements of SSTRO from the SSTRO JOC, p. 2.

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